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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that while the GDPR has arguably delivered positive
outcomes by enhancing the protection afforded to data subjects, it has also
had adverse effects on competition by strengthening the position of large
online platforms in certain markets. In addition, the GDPR has given large
platforms a tool to harm rivals by restricting access to the data they need to
compete effectively. The present paper focuses on digital advertising and the
ad tech industry, where the GDPR appears to have strengthened Google and
Facebook. The purpose of this paper is not to call for the weakening of the
GDPR, whose positive impact on users cannot be ignored. While from a
policy standpoint regulators should thus maintain or even increase the level
of protection offered by this legislation, it is vital that they take steps to
mitigate its adverse effects on other dimensions of welfare, such as
competition.
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I. Introduction
The General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) lies at the core of the
EU digital privacy legislation,1 and is arguably one of the world’s most
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1Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the pro-
tection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
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comprehensive data protection legislations. At a time when personal data
are one of the primary inputs for an increasingly large number of econ-
omic activities, the GDPR is likely to have a significant impact on
businesses operating in the EU, in that it may impose restrictions on
the way they conduct their operations, affect their costs, and alter the
structure of the markets in which they operate. In an ideal world, the
regulatory requirements contained in the GDPR, and the way they are
implemented, should deliver the best outcome for society in terms of
enhancing the privacy of individuals without undermining other com-
ponents of social welfare, such as competition, investment and
innovation.
However, as this paper will argue, while the GDPR has delivered posi-
tive outcomes by enhancing the protection afforded to users of digital ser-
vices and strengthening the rights of data subjects, it has also had adverse
effects on competition by strengthening the position of large online plat-
forms on digital markets, at the very same time that the European Com-
mission (the “Commission”) has expressed concerns about the market
power held by these companies,2 and is even considering adopting ex
ante regulation for so-called digital gatekeepers.3 This is what we under-
stand by “GDPR Myopia”: in its effort to improve the protection of data
subjects, the GDPR worsened one of the main problems experienced in
digital markets today, which is increased market concentration and
reduced contestability. In addition, the GDPR seems to have given
large platforms a tool to harm rivals by reducing access to the data
they need to run their business.
There is a growing body of economic literature and commentary
showing that the costs of implementing the GDPR benefit large online
platforms, and that consent-based data collection gives a competitive
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (“GDPR”), L 119/1GDPR provides for a strong and coherent
data protection framework in the EU and aims to ensure the free flow of data. Together with the ePriv-
acy Directive, (Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communi-
cations sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), OJ L 201), they provide the legal
framework to ensure digital privacy for EU citizens. See European Commission, ‘Shaping Europe’s
digital future: Digital Privacy’ <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/online-privacy>.
2See Commission Communication (n 1) 8:
Some platforms have acquired significant scale, which effectively allows them to act as private
gatekeepers to markets, customers and information. We must ensure that the systemic role of
certain online platforms and the market power they acquire will not put in danger the fairness
and openness of our markets.
3See the Commission’s website on the Digital Services Act package – ex ante regulatory instrument of
very large online platforms acting as gatekeepers <https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/
have-your-say/initiatives/12418-Digital-Services-Act-package-ex-ante-regulatory-instrument-of-very-
large-online-platforms-acting-as-gatekeepers>.
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advantage to firms offering a range of consumer-facing products com-
pared to smaller market actors. This in turn increases concentration in
a number of digital markets where access to data is important, by creating
barriers to entry or encouraging market exit.4 While it is still early to
quantify the impact of the GDPR on competition in these markets,
some papers are already providing empirical evidence supporting the
view that market concentration has increased.
The present paper uses as a case study the adverse consequences of the
GDPR on competition in the so-called ad tech industry, which comprises
the various categories of companies that provide online advertising ser-
vices to advertisers and publishers of online content. Broadly speaking,
online advertising may be divided between search advertising (whereby
search ads are shown in the search results of a search engine) and
display advertising (whereby display ads are shown in the website or
app of a publisher). In turn, display advertising may take place on
owned and operated properties of large online platforms such as those
of Facebook and Google or on the open web, i.e. the myriads of publish-
ers of online content.5 Google and Facebook alone capture the lion’s
share of digital ad revenue.6 In the case of advertising on the open
web, interactions between publishers and advertisers are typically facili-
tated by a range of so-called ad tech intermediaries, such as ad servers,
ad exchanges/Supply-Side Platforms (“SSPs”) and Demand-Side Plat-
forms (“DSPs”).7 These actors help match the demand for ad inventory
by advertisers (e.g. Nike, BMW or Nestle) with the supply of such
4See, e.g. James David Campbell, Avi Goldfarb and Catherine Tucker, ‘Privacy Regulation and Market
Structure’ (2015) 24(1) Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 47; Michal S Gal and Oshrit
Aviv, ‘The Unintended Competitive Effects of the GDPR’ (2020) Journal of Competition Law and Econ-
omics <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3548444>; Jian Jia, Ginger Zhe Jin and Liad Wagman, ‘The
Short-Run Effects of GDPR on Technology Venture Investment’ 8 November 2019 <https://papers.
ssrn.com/abstract=3278912>; Daniel L Rubinfeld and Michal S Gal, ‘Access Barriers to Big Data’
(2017) 59 Arizona Law Review 339 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2830586>; Eline Chivot and
Daniel Castro, ‘What the Evidence Shows About the Impact of the GDPR After One Year’ Center for
Data Innovation, June 2019 <www.datainnovation.org/2019/06/what-the-evidence-shows-about-
the-impact-of-the-gdpr-after-one-year/>. See, also, Ivana Kottasová, ‘These Companies Are Getting
Killed by GDPR’ (CNN Business, 11 May 2018) <https://money.cnn.com/2018/05/11/technology/gdpr-
tech-companies-losers/index.html>; ‘How the GDPR Impacts and Suffocates Small and Medium
Businesses’ (i-Scoop) <www.i-scoop.eu/gdpr/gdpr-small-medium-businesses/>; Kevin Koerner, ‘GDPR
– Boosting or Choking Europe’s Data Economy?’ (DB Research, 13 June 2018) <www.dbresearch.
com/servlet/reweb2.ReWEB?rwsite=RPS_EN-PROD&rwobj=ReDisplay.Start.class&document=
PROD0000000000470381>; Jedidiah Yeh, ‘GDPR Will Make Big Tech Even Bigger’ (Forbes, 26 June 2018)
<www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/06/26/gdpr-will-make-big-tech-even-bigger/>.
5See Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Online Platforms and Digital Advertising’ Market Study Final
Report, 1 July 2019, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5efc57ed3a6f4023d242ed56/
Final_report_1_July_2020_.pdf>, (‘CMA Final Report’), para 5.23 et seq.
6Nicole Perrin, ‘Facebook-Google Duopoly Won’t Crack This Year’ (eMarketer, 4 November 2019) <www.
emarketer.com/content/facebook-google-duopoly-won-t-crack-this-year>.
7For an overview of the ad tech supply chain, see CMA Final Report, paras 5.204–5.211.
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inventory by publishers (e.g. news publishers, online game developers
and other providers of digital content) and/or provide the necessary
tools for the display of the ad. The ad tech industry – which is now domi-
nated by “programmatic advertising”,8 including “real time bidding” or
“RTB” (which allows publishers to monetize their inventory by selling
it to buyers through a real-time auction system)9 – represents an ideal
case study on the effects of the GDPR on competition for two reasons.
First, access to user data plays a central role in the provision of ad tech
services. With the rise of programmatic advertising, there has been a shift
in online advertising from the context (i.e. the content of the website) to
the user. Advertisers place less emphasis on where their advertisement
will be shown (aside from brand-safety issues), and instead base their
decision according to the specific user that will be exposed to the ad,
which explains why access to data about the user (e.g. behavioural, socio-
demographic or geographical data) is so critical.10 Because the GDPR
places restrictions on the extent to which data can be collected and pro-
cessed, it is therefore likely to have a material impact on this industry.
Second, the ad tech industry is characterized by the presence of a par-
ticularly strong player, Google, which dominates the ad tech ecosystem
(as illustrated in Figure 1).11 In this market, Google competes with a rela-
tively small number of medium-size players, as well as a range of small
market actors. While Facebook also offers ad tech tools, it mainly uses
its tools to serve ads on its own “walled gardens” (i.e. Facebook, Insta-
gram, etc.), rather than on the open web.
Through acquisitions and organic growth, Google is present at vir-
tually every step of the value chain between advertisers wishing to buy
third-party display inventory and publishers.12 Google offers the
8See Allison Schiff, ‘Zenith: Programmatic Display Will Eat The World By 2019’ (AdExchanger, 20 Novem-
ber 2017) <www.adexchanger.com/online-advertising/zenith-programmatic-display-will-eat-world-
2019/>; Joe Mandese, ‘IAB: Programmatic Now 85% Of All U.S. Digital Advertising’ (MediaPost, 24 Feb-
ruary 2020) <www.mediapost.com/publications/article/347524/iab-programmatic-now-85-of-all-us-
digital-adve.html>.
9See Ian Simpson, ‘Real-Time Bidding (RTB) & Programmatic: One and the Same?’ (The Clearcode Blog)
<https://clearcode.cc/blog/difference-between-rtb-programmatic/>; Michael Sweeney, ‘How Real-
Time Bidding (RTB) Changed Online Display Advertising’ (The Clearcode Blog) <https://clearcode.cc/
blog/real-time-bidding-online-display-advertising/>.
10Damien Geradin and Dimitrios Katsifis, ‘An EU Competition Law Analysis of Online Display Advertising
in the Programmatic Age’ (2019) 15(1) European Competition Journal 61; ‘5 Ways to Use Data-driven
Advertising’ (MarTech Advisor, 21 May 2018), <www.martechadvisor.com/articles/data-management/
5-ways-to-use-datadriven-advertising/>.
11Autorité de la concurrence, ‘Opinion 18-A-03 of 6 March 2018 on Data Processing in the Online Adver-
tising Sector’ para 218.
12Notably Google acquired the following ad tech companies: DoubleClick, a company that owned the
leading publisher ad server tool DART for Publishers, in 2007; mobile ad network AdMob in 2009;
leading DSP Invite Media in 2010; Admeld, leading SSP, in 2011; and ad attribution company
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leading ad server for publishers (DoubleClick for Publishers or “DFP”,
now part of Google Ad Manager or “GAM”), the leading ad server for
advertisers (DoubleClick Campaign Manager, now known as Campaign
Manager), two ad networks (AdSense, AdMob) the leading ad exchange/
SSP (Google Ad Exchange or “AdX”, now part of GAM) and the leading
third-party display ad buying solutions (AdWords, now known as Google
Ads, and DoubleClick Bid Manager, now known as Display & Video 360
or “DV360”). As shown in Figure 1, the CMA found Google to have very
high market shares (at least 50%) in each step of the ad tech chain.
In this paper, we do not try to show that the GDPR has an adverse
impact on publishers, as we already know from the economic literature
that restrictions on the use of data on privacy grounds negatively
impact publishers’ revenues.13 Rather, we show that while it could have
been initially thought that the GDPR would have negatively impacted
Google’s ability to deliver ad tech services given the enormous amount
of data it collects and processes, and thus weaken its dominance in
such services, the opposite scenario happened. For reasons that will be
explained in this paper, the GDPR has strengthened Google’s market pos-
ition compared to smaller rivals, which have been less capable of absorb-
ing the implementation costs of the GDPR and coping with the
restrictions on the collection and processing of data. Google’s question-
able data-related practices, and in particular its “internal data free-for-
all”, have also so far been left unchallenged by the Irish Data Protection
Authority (“DPA”), while the practices of much smaller actors have been
subject to harsh intervention by overly zealous DPAs.
Moreover, as will be demonstrated below, large online platforms are
increasingly invoking the GDPR – or privacy concerns more generally
– as an excuse to engage in controversial and potentially restrictive
Adometry, in 2014. See Michael Arrington, ‘Breaking: Google Spends $3.1 Billion to Acquire Double-
Click’ (Tech Crunch, 13 April 2007) <https://techcrunch.com/2007/04/13/google-spends-31-billion-
for-doubleclick/>; Brian Morrissey, ‘Google to Acquire AdMob for $750 Mil’ (Adweek, 9 November
2009) <www.adweek.com/digital/google-acquire-admob-750-mil-100852/>; Erick Schonfeld, ‘Google
Confirms Invite Media Acquisition, Brings Bidding to Display Ads’ (Tech Crunch, 3 June 2010)
<https://techcrunch.com/2010/06/03/google-confirms-invite-media/>; Michael Learmonth, ‘Google
Acquires Ad-Optimization Firm Admeld for $400 Million’ (AdAge, 9 June 2011) <https://adage.com/
article/digital/google-acquires-ad-optimization-firm-admeld-400-million/228108>; Anthony Ha,
‘Google Acquires Adometry To Bring More Attribution to Google Analytics’ (Tech Crunch, 6 May
2014) <https://techcrunch.com/2014/05/06/google-acquires-adometry/>.
13See, e.g. Avi Goldfarb and Katherine Tucker, ‘Privacy Regulation and Online Advertising’ May 2010
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1600259> (“showing empirically that even moderate privacy regu-
lation reduces the effectiveness of online advertising”); Garrett Johnson, ‘The Impact of Privacy Policy
on the Auction Market for Online Display Advertising’ Simon School Working Paper No. FR 13-26,
October 2013 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2333193> (“estimating the financial impact of
privacy policies on the online display advertising industry and showing that depending on the type
of privacy policy in place the revenues of online publishers drop between 3.9 and 38.5%”).
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practices. This could be referred to as the “weaponization” of the GDPR
and privacy. We will also see that large online platforms like Google have
become de facto privacy regulators able to impose their view on privacy to
thousands or even millions of businesses that rely on them. On the posi-
tive side, it seems that competition enforcers are gradually becoming
aware of this worrying trend and seem willing to engage.
Studying the effects of the GDPR on the ad tech market is important
for two reasons. First, ad tech companies offer effective tools to adverti-
sers to target the users who are the most likely to be interested in their
products and services. Second, online advertising on the open web,
which is facilitated by ad tech tools, represents a major – and, in some
cases, the only – source of revenues for the tens of thousands of publish-
ers (from large news brands to online game producers to specialist blog-
gers) that provide valuable content and services to Internet users for free.
Both advertisers and publishers, which are central actors of the digital
economy, therefore share an interest in the competitive provision of ad
tech services, as competition is necessary to maintain low intermediation
fees, choice and innovation.
This does not mean that the ad tech industry is the only sector affected
by the GDPR. For instance, Johnson and Shriver have shown in a recent
paper that the GDPR has increased concentration among the broad cat-
egory of web technology vendors.14 Similarly, Peukert et al. have shown
that with the introduction of the GDPR, Google has increased its market
share in web technology markets.15 In addition, as many digital products
and services rely on access to data – including banking, music and video
streaming, online travel agencies, online retailing, healthcare, and even
manufacturing – competition could also be affected in these industries.
Moreover, our analysis of the adverse effects of the GDPR on competition
in the ad tech sector cannot be interpreted as suggesting that the GDPR
does not have adverse effects on other desirable outcomes from a welfare
standpoint, such as the development of new technologies, the funding of
startups, etc., but these effects have either been documented elsewhere16
or should be the subject of sector-specific analysis.
The purpose of this paper is not to call for the weakening of the GDPR,
whose positive impact on users of digital services cannot be ignored. The
14Garrett Johnson and Scott Shiver, ‘Privacy & Market Concentration: Intended & Unintended Conse-
quences of the GDPR’ November 2019 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3477686>.
15Christian Peukert et al., ‘European Privacy Law and Global Markets for Data’ CEPR, DP 14475, March
2020 <https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=14475>.
16See Jia and others (n 4); Chivot and Castro (n 4).
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GDPR has considerably increased privacy awareness among both
companies and data subjects across the EU. Moreover, the GDPR has
strengthened the rights of data subjects, allowing them to “obtain from
the controller confirmation as to whether or not personal data
concerning him or her are being processed, and, where that is the case,
access to the personal data” and detailed information on inter alia the
purposes of processing, the categories of personal data being processed,
the recipients of any data transfers and whether any automated
decision-making, including profiling, is involved.17 Data subjects avail
themselves of the opportunity to exercise their rights and are more
than eager to submit complaints if they consider that violations of their
rights have occurred.18
However, the adverse effects of the GDPR on competition and inno-
vation in certain digital industries should not be ignored. From a
policy standpoint, the Commission, as well as the authorities that are
entrusted with the enforcement of the GDPR, should aim at maintaining
or even increasing the level of protection offered by this legislation, while
at the same time trying to mitigate its adverse effects on other dimensions
of welfare, such as competition (and its positive impact on choice, inno-
vation and investment), which are equally important for both businesses
and consumers. It is with this objective in mind that the present paper
offers various solutions that could be explored to ensure a better
balance between privacy and these other welfare dimensions.
This paper is divided in six parts. Part II briefly discusses the prin-
ciples of the GDPR that are particularly relevant in the context of
online advertising, such as the principles of lawfulness and purpose limit-
ation. It also explains the GDPR’s enforcement mechanism, which relies
on a decentralized “one-stop-shop” system. Part III analyses the unin-
tended consequences of the GDPR, namely the risk that it increases
market concentration in the ad tech industry , which was already charac-
terized by a high degree of concentration on some of its segments. The
risk of increased market concentration is due to the following reasons.
First, compliance costs may create barriers to entry or may cause exit.
Second, large online platforms benefit from advertisers’ trust, which
therefore prefer to concentrate their ad spending on such platforms.
17GDPR, Article 15.
18As of January 2019, more than 95,000 complaints have been submitted by data subjects who believe
that their rights under the GDPR have been violated or by organizations mandated by such individuals.
European Commission, ‘GDPR in numbers – Infographic’ 25 January 2019 <https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/sites/beta-political/files/190125_gdpr_infographics_v4.pdf>.
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Third, it is easier for a large platform to obtain end-user consent through
their consumer-facing products. Fourth, restrictions on data sharing fol-
lowing from the GDPR give a competitive advantage to large platforms
which are able to acquire large volumes of data through their own con-
sumer-facing products. Finally, the GDPR’s one-stop-shop mechanism
has led to arbitrary enforcement to the benefit of tech companies estab-
lished in “friendly” jurisdictions.
Part IV shows that, although the GDPR imposes heavy compliance
costs and has triggered investigations with significant consequences on
small ad tech players, it has done nothing so far to address criticizable
practices, such as Google’s tactic of combining data it collects across its
user-facing services and using it for a wide variety of purposes. We con-
sider that this “internal data free-for-all” is questionable under the GDPR,
while at the same time it allows Google to engage in so-called envelop-
ment strategies through cross-data use. Part V discusses a worrying
trend, which is the use of the GDPR (or privacy concerns more generally)
as an excuse by large platforms to engage in anticompetitive conducts.
We discuss various examples, namely Google’s decision to remove
YouTube inventory from AdX, restrict the portability of the DoubleClick
ID, as well as phase out third-party cookies on Chrome within a period of
two years. Finally, Part VI provides recommendations to remedy the
GDPR’s shortcomings that affect competition.
II. The GDPR in a nutshell
TheGDPR came into force on 25May 2018with the aims of strengthening
the data protection framework within the EU, providing a uniform
regulatory data protection environment and ensuring the free movement
of data.19 The GDPR is a flexible instrument: it takes a risk-based
approach, based on key principles that must be complied with, and does
not prescribe a single way of compliance. Consequently, it can be
applied to a range of organizations and situations, allowing for new
things to be done in new ways, all while upholding personal data
protection.
This Part provides a brief overview of the regulatory principles
enshrined in the GDPR which are particularly relevant to the ad
19GDPR, Recitals 1, 7 and 10 and Article 1(2) and 1(3). The right to the protection of natural persons in
relation to the processing of personal data is a fundamental right enshrined in Article 8(1) of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 16(1) of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union.
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tech sector (Section A), as well as of the way in which it is enforced
(Section B).
A. The principles enshrined in the GDPR
The GDPR centres around seven principles: “lawfulness, fairness and
transparency”, “purpose limitation”, “data minimization”, “accuracy”,
“storage limitation”, “integrity and confidentiality” and “accountabil-
ity”.20 Any data collection and processing must comply with the above
principles.
In the ad tech context, the obligations imposed on data controllers on
the basis of the principles of “lawfulness” (Subsection 1), “purpose limit-
ation” (Subsection 2) and “accountability” (Subsection 3) are particularly
worthy of discussion, as their implementation has been subject to con-
siderable debate, leading to legal uncertainty.
1. The principle of lawfulness
The “principle of lawfulness” only allows processing of personal data if
one of the six legal bases for processing set out in Article 6(1) of the
GDPR is applicable.21 In most cases, data processing in the context of
online advertising will rely on the data subject’s consent.22 The GDPR
20GDPR, Article 5.
21GDPR, Article 6(1):
Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: (a)
the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or
more specific purposes; (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to
which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject
prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obli-
gation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the
vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary
for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official
authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate
interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are over-
ridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require
protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. [Emphasis added]
22While this discussion does not fall within the scope of this paper, it must be noted that there is indus-
try-wide uncertainty as to whether and under which circumstances the “legitimate interests” legal
basis can be used when Real-Time Bidding (RTB), a core feature of programmatic advertising, is
involved. The prevailing view is that “legitimate interests” might not be an appropriate legal basis
in this context for the following reasons. First, RTB protocols often include data fields that constitute
special categories of personal data within the meaning of Article 9(1) of the GDPR and for which the
explicit consent of the data subject is required. Second, RTB usually involves the use of cookies in order
to build profiles of users based on their habits and online behaviour and serve better-targeted ads.
According to Article 5(3) of the e-Privacy Directive, the use of cookies requires the positive and unam-
biguous consent of the data subject. Third, it is argued that even in cases not involving the processing
of sensitive personal data or the use of cookies, the balancing exercise required – which consists in
proving that processing is not disproportionate, intrusive and unfair – is highly unlikely to tilt in
favor of the data controller, given the scale of creation and sharing of personal data profiles involved
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requires that consent be “freely given, specific, informed and unambigu-
ous”. It must also be given “by a statement or by a clear affirmative
action”.23 Consequently, scrolling or swiping through a webpage or a
similar activity does not satisfy the requirement of a clear and affirmative
action.24 Moreover, it is imperative that the data subject be given “the
right to withdraw his or her consent at any time” and that withdrawal
of consent be “as easy […] as to give consent”.25
In essence, the GDPR emphasizes the granular nature of consent and
sets out various conditions, by requiring keeping records of consent,
clarity and prominence of consent requests, the right to withdraw
consent and avoiding making consent a condition of a contract or of pro-
vision of a service.26 In practice, and in order to help the wider ad tech
ecosystem comply with the GDPR, the Interactive Advertising Bureau
Europe (“IAB Europe”), in collaboration with the IAB Tech Lab, has
developed the Transparency and Consent Framework, a standardized
framework publishers may use to collect user consent (with the help of
so-called Consent Management Platforms) and transmit it across the
supply chain.27
Consent can only be “freely given” when the data subject has a real
choice between consenting to the processing of her data or not, does
not feel compelled to consent and will not face negative consequences
if she does not consent.28 According to the GDPR, when establishing
whether consent is freely given, “account shall be taken of whether,
inter alia, […] the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to
in RTB. See ICO, ‘Update report into ad tech and real time bidding’ 20 June 2019, 18 <https://ico.org.
uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/2615156/adtech-real-time-bidding-report-201906.pdf>; Article
29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 06/2014 on the Notion of Legitimate Interests of the
Data Controller Under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC’ WP 217, 9 April 2014, pages 26 and 30.
However, as the GDPR does not prescribe what legal basis has to be used in abstracto, the “legitimate
interests” legal basis might be relevant for some types of data processing in the context of online
advertising (e.g. for a publisher’s processing of personal data when online advertising is a crucial
part of a publisher’s business model) but not for other types of processing (e.g. processing by third
parties such as ad tech vendors).
23GDPR, Article 4(11).
24European Data Protection Board, ‘Guidelines 05/2020 on consent under Regulation 2016/679. Version
1.0’ 4 May 2020, para 86.
25GDPR, Article 7(3).
26See ICO, ‘Consent – Is This a Big Change?’ <https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-
protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/consent/whats-new/>.
27For more information, see <https://iabeurope.eu/transparency-consent-framework/>. IAB launched
the Transparency and Consent Framework (TCF) v.1.1 in April 2018. In August 2019 IAB launched
TCF v.2.0, which is expected to replace TCF v.1.1 in summer 2020. Note that TCF’s compliance with
the GDPR is currently the subject of an investigation by the Belgian DPA. The latter has taken the pre-
liminary view that the TCF could be in breach of the GDPR. See ‘Vista Equity Partners CEO Nabbed For
Tax Fraud; IAB Europe’s TCF Disputed In Belgium’ (AdExchanger, 19 October 2020) <www.adexchanger.
com/ad-exchange-news/monday-10192020/>.
28EDPB (n 24) para 13.
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the processing of personal data”.29 Therefore, if consent is bundled with
the acceptance of terms and conditions or if the provision of a contract or
a service is tied to a request for consent to the processing of personal data
that are not necessary for the performance of that contract or service,
consent is not deemed to be valid.30
Consent must moreover be “specific” to the purpose for which data are
collected. In other words, if the data collected are processed for various
purposes, the data subject must consent to each of these purposes.
Consent must furthermore be “informed” in the sense that prior to
giving consent, the data subject should be informed in an “intelligible
and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language” about the
terms and purposes of the processing.31 The GDPR sets out minimum
content requirements for consent to be deemed “informed”, including
information on the purpose of each of the processing operations for
which consent is sought, the type of data collected and used, and any reci-
pients or categories of recipients of personal data.32
2. The principle of purpose limitation
The principle of purpose limitation comprises two “building blocks”,
requiring first, that personal data are “collected for specified, explicit
and legitimate purposes” (purpose specification) and second, that they
are “not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those
purposes” (compatible use).33 In case processing takes place for “a
purpose other than that for which the personal data have been collected”,
the controller must ascertain whether “processing for another purpose is
compatible with the purpose for which the personal data are initially
collected”.34
The first building block of the purpose limitation principle requires
that, no later than the time when personal data collection occurs, the
29GDPR, Article 7(4).
30EDPB (n 24) para 26.
31GDPR, Article 7(2).
32GDPR, Articles 13 and 14.
33Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation’WP 203, 2 April 2013,
11.
34GDPR, Article 6(4): for this reason the processor must take into account, inter alia:
(a) any link between the purposes for which the personal data have been collected and the
purposes of the intended further processing; (b) the context in which the personal data
have been collected, in particular regarding the relationship between data subjects and the
controller; (c) the nature of the personal data, in particular whether special categories of per-
sonal data are processed, pursuant to Article 9, or whether personal data related to criminal
convictions and offences are processed, pursuant to Article 10; (d) the possible consequences
of the intended further processing for data subjects; (e) the existence of appropriate safe-
guards, which may include encryption or pseudonymisation.
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purposes of processing must be “clearly revealed, explained or expressed
in some intelligible form”.35 It further requires that processing be at all
times in accordance with all provisions of applicable data protection
law, as well as other applicable laws such as contract or consumer protec-
tion laws.36 But most importantly, the purpose specification component
of this principle requires that the purpose of the collection “must be
detailed enough to determine what kind of processing is and is not
included within the specified purpose, and to allow that compliance
with the law can be assessed and data protection safeguards applied”.37
The degree of detail depends on the personal data involved and the par-
ticular context in which they are collected.38
The second building block of the purpose limitation principle, namely
compatible use, requires a substantive rather than formal assessment to
be carried out by the data controller. Key factors in this assessment are
the relationship between the initial purpose and the purpose of further
processing, the context in which the data were collected and the
reasonable expectations of the data subjects as to their further use
based on that context, the nature of the data and the impact of the
further processing on the data subjects and the safeguards applied by
the controller to ensure fair processing and to prevent any undue
impact on the data subjects.39
3. The principle of accountability
The principle of accountability requires that the controller implement
“appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure and to be
able to demonstrate that processing is performed in accordance with
[the GDPR]”.40 Compliance with this principle is burdensome as it
requires, inter alia, adopting and implementing data protection policies,
maintaining documentation of processing activities, recording and,
where necessary, reporting data breaches, carrying out Data Protection
Impact Assessments and appointing a Data Protection Officer (“DPO”).41
It must be noted that such compatibility examination is not required if the further processing is based
on “the data subject’s consent or on a Union or Member State law which constitutes a necessary and
proportionate measure in a democratic society to safeguard the objectives referred to in Article 23(1)”.




39ibid 21 et seq.
40GDPR, Article 24(1).
41See ICO, ‘Accountability and Governance’ <https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-
protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/accountability-and-governance/>.
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What is more, the principle of accountability is not limited within
the company’s walls but extends to ensuring compliance with the
GDPR by all organizations that provide data to or receive data from
the company.42 In other words, when a company receives data from
an external data provider it must ensure that the data have been
extracted and used in accordance with the GDPR – for example,
with the valid consent of the data subject. Similarly, when a
company supplies data to third parties, it must also ensure that the
receiver complies with the GDPR – for example, that processing
takes place only for reasons for which the data subject has given
consent or that the rights of the data subject are respected. Compliance
with the accountability principle thus entails both direct costs, i.e. the
cost of monitoring, screening and auditing of data activities of third
parties, and indirect costs in the sense of the lost ability to use any
data that are non-compliant. The onus is greater for smaller compa-
nies as they have limited resources to comply with the GDPR and
monitor compliance by third parties.
B. Enforcement of the GDPR: the one-stop-Shop principle
The GDPR provides for a decentralized implementation system, whereby
each Member State “shall provide for one or more independent public
authorities to be responsible for monitoring the application of [the
GDPR]”.43 Each supervisory authority “shall be competent for the per-
formance of the tasks assigned to and the exercise of the powers con-
ferred on it in accordance with [the GDPR]”.44
When cross-border processing takes place, the GDPR establishes a
one-stop-shop system, according to which “the supervisory authority of
the main establishment or of the single establishment of the controller
or processor shall be competent to act as lead supervisory authority”.45
Put simply, the authority of the main establishment of the controller or
processor will have the primary responsibility for dealing with and inves-
tigating any complaints from data subjects across the EU regarding the
42See Gal and Aviv (n 4) 16.
43GDPR, Article 51(1).
44GDPR, Article 55(1).
45GDPR, Article 56(1). While under certain circumstances a supervisory authority other than that of the
main establishment of the controller or processor may be competent to handle a complaint or to inves-
tigate a possible infringement of the GDPR – notably when “the subject matter relates only to an
establishment in its Member State or substantially affects data subjects only in its Member State” –
this can only be done if the lead supervisory authority decides not to handle the case. GDPR,
Article 56(2), (3) and (5).
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processing of their personal data.46 This allows businesses operating in
different countries to deal with one DPA – the DPA of their main estab-
lishment being the “sole interlocutor of the controller or processor for the
cross-border possessing carried out by that controller or processor”.47
At the same time, the GDPR establishes a “cooperation and consist-
ency” mechanism that sets out the framework for cooperation, exchange
of information and the conduct of joint operations between the lead and
other supervisory authorities.48 As a result, DPAs other than the lead
DPA can play their part in investigations of and decisions against con-
trollers or processors that engage in cross-border processing. The ulti-
mate aim is to reach consensus. Thus, the lead DPA must “submit a
draft decision to the other supervisory authorities concerned for their
opinion and take due account of their views.”49 If other DPAs express rel-
evant and reasoned objections to the draft decision and the lead supervi-
sory authority does not wish to follow the views of these DPAs, it must
submit the matter to the consistency mechanism set out in the GDPR,
whereby the matter is handled within the European Data Protection
Board (“EDPB”).50 The EDPB issues a binding decision and the lead
supervisory authority must adopt its final decision on the basis of the
board’s decision.51
While the cooperation and consistency mechanism is a positive devel-
opment in that it allows non-lead DPAs to have an active role in inves-
tigations and decisions (even though it may not have yet reached its
full potential),52 the one-stop-shop principle has arguably granted dis-
proportionate enforcement power to certain DPAs, namely the DPAs
of EU Member States in which the large digital platforms, such as
Apple, Google, Facebook and Amazon, are established. In the online
advertising sector, Ireland – home, amongst others, to Google and Face-
book – is at the forefront of GDPR enforcement. Its ability and
46Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines for Identifying a Controller or Processor’s Lead
Supervisory Authority’ WP 244 rev.01, 5 April 2017, page 4.
47GDPR, Article 56(6); European Commission, ‘The GDPR: New Opportunities, New Obligations – What




50GDPR, Articles 60(4), 63 and 65. The EDPB comprises “the head of one supervisory authority of each
Member State and of the European Data Protection Supervisor, or their respective representatives”.
GDPR, Article 68(3).
51GDPR, Article 65.
52Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 24 June 2020,
‘Data Protection as a Pillar of Citizens’ Empowerment and the EU’s Approach to the Digital Transition
– Two Years of Application of the General Data Protection Regulation’ COM(2020) 264 final, page 5.
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willingness to investigate and sanction these companies therefore deter-
mines whether these companies will be able to get away with questionable
data processing activities or will be held to account.53 At the same time,
controllers and processors that fall under the supervision of zealous
DPAs are more likely to be subject to lengthy investigations and hefty
fines.
III. GDPR’s unintended consequences
The GDPR has altered profoundly the modern privacy landscape, placing
the EU at the forefront of data protection in the digital era. Besides
affording individuals with greater control over their data, the GDPR has
also the potential to strengthen competition in digital markets, particularly
by affording data subjects with the right to “data portability”,54 that is the
right to transfer their data from one controller to another. As the authors
of the expert report on Competition Policy for the digital era observe, the
right to data portability may facilitate the data subject’s switching
between services, in that it helps reduce data-induced lock-in effects (e.g.
a user of a social network can switch to a new network without losing
her data, which could otherwise discourage her from switching).55 The
potential of data portability to strengthen competition in digital markets
has been widely acknowledged in literature and in various reports,56
53Of course, if the Irish DPA investigates, e.g. Facebook, according to the cooperation and consistency
mechanism, other DPAs, e.g. the CNIL, will be involved and will input into the final decision.
However, the Irish DPA will still be the “lead”.
54Article 20 of the GDPR provides that
the data subject shall have the right to receive the personal data concerning him or her, which
he or she has provided to a controller, in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable
format and have the right to transmit those data to another controller without hindrance from
the controller to which the personal data have been provided.
According to recital 68, the right to data portability was introduced “[t]o further strengthen the [data
subject’s] control over his or her own data”.
55Jacques Crémer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye and Heike Schweitzer, ‘Competition Policy for the Digital
Era, Final report’ (2019) pages 81 and 83 <https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/
kd0419345enn.pdf>. The authors note, however, that Article 20 of the GDPR has not been designed
“as a right to continuous data access or to request data interoperability between two or more services
employed by the data subject”. Thus, while it may facilitate switching, it has not been designed “to
facilitate multi-homing or the offering of complementary services, which frequently relies on continu-
ous, and potentially real-time, data access”. See ibid 81–82. For an overview of how consumer data
rights may affect competition, see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Consu-
mer Data Rights and Competition’ DAF/COMP(2020)1, 29 April 2020 <https://one.oecd.org/document/
DAF/COMP(2020)1/en/pdf>.
56See e.g. Jan Krämer, Pierre Senellart and Alexandre de Streel, ‘Making Data Portability More Effective
for The Digital Economy’ Report for the Centre on Regulation in Europe, (June 2020) pages 55–60
<https://cerre.eu/publications/report-making-data-portability-more-effective-digital-economy/>. For
an earlier view, see Inge Graef, Jeroen Verschakelen and Peggy Valcke, ‘Putting the Right to Data Port-
ability into a Competition Law Perspective’ (2013) Law: The Journal of the Higher School of Economics,
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including the CMA’s Final Report on its market study on online platforms
and digital advertising.57
On the other hand, the GDPR may have negative effects on compe-
tition. While there is a growing public concern about the unparalleled
amounts of data accumulated by a few digital platforms,58 one of the
paradoxes of the GDPR is that it may strengthen these large platforms
to the detriment of smaller market actors. As pointed out by Gal and
Aviv in a recent paper, the GDPR could therefore lead to further
market concentration.59 While their paper is general in nature, in that
it does not focus on one digital market in particular, we will see that
Gal and Aviv’s concern that the GDPR could increase market concen-
tration applies with full force in the ad tech sector for the reasons dis-
cussed hereafter.
First, the implementation of the GDPR and the related compliance
costs may create barriers to entry or may cause exit (Subsection 1).
Second, large online platforms, such as Google, benefit from advertisers’
trust, which therefore tend to concentrate their ad spend on them (Subsec-
tion 2). Third, it is easier for large platforms to obtain end-user consent
through their numerous consumer-facing products (Subsection 3).
Fourth, the GDPR’s restrictions in data sharing give a competitive advan-
tage to ad tech players that are able to acquire large troves of data through
their consumer-facing products (Subsection 4). Fifth, the one-stop-shop
system provided for in the GDPR seems to have led to arbitrary enforce-
ment to the benefit of large platforms located in “friendly” jurisdictions
(Subsection 5). Finally, while it is early to quantify the impact of the
GDPR on concentration in ad tech markets, we discuss the results of
two recent empirical papers addressing this issue (Subsection 6).
Annual Review 53 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2416537>. But see also Gabriel Nicholas and Michael
Weinberg, ‘Data Portability and Platform Competition: Is User Data Exported from Facebook Actually
Useful to Competitors?’ Engelberg Center on Innovation Law & Policy (arguing that the ability of data
portability to address competition concerns raised by large social networks is limited).
57The CMA explored data portability as a potential data-related remedy in social media and digital adver-
tisingmarkets. See CMAFinal Report, ‘AppendixW, Assessment of Pro-Competition Interventions in Social
Media’ <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5efb5fcbd3bf7f769a4e776b/Appendix_W_-_
Interventions_in_Social_Media_v.3.pdf>; CMA Final Report, ‘Appendix Z, Assessment of Potential
Data-Related Interventions in Digital Advertising Markets’ <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
media/5efc3f7ae90e075c5aeb9947/Appendix_Z_-_Data_related_interventions_in_digital_advertising_
markets.pdf>.
58See, for example, Forbrukerrådet, ‘New Analysis Shows How Facebook and Google Push Users into
Sharing Personal Data’ 27 June 2018 <www.forbrukerradet.no/side/facebook-and-google-
manipulate-users-into-sharing-personal-data/>; Oscar Gonzalez, ‘Here’s How Much Information Face-
book and Google Have on You’ (Inverse, 27 March 2018) <www.inverse.com/article/42883-facebook-
google-user-info>.
59Gal and Aviv (n 4).
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1. Implementation costs create barriers to entry or may even cause exit
Compliance with the GDPR is a particularly onerous task for small and
medium-size ad tech providers, as it places a particularly heavy burden
on their resources. They must inter alia put in place consent gathering
mechanisms (for example, have a Consent Management Platform),
provide detailed information regarding their data processing activities,
implement technical and organizational measures to ensure compliance
with the GDPR, monitor and document GDPR compliance (e.g. by
keeping detailed records of their processing activities), carry out Data
Protection Impact Assessments and have a designated DPO.60 Compa-
nies with data presence in the EU have been required to spend millions
to comply with the GDPR.61
The human resources and capital costs involved in ensuring compli-
ance with the GDPR disproportionately burden small and medium-
size vendors – which are limited in terms of both financial resources
and personnel. While a big company has dozens if not hundreds of
experts working on GDPR compliance,62 most ad tech companies do
not have the lawyers, data experts and programmers necessary to
make compliance with the GDPR a smooth and effective process.63
Additionally, compliance with the burdensome requirements of the
GDPR, such as adopting technical and organizational measures and
monitoring and documenting data flows, exhibits economies of scale
and scope, which tend to create a competitive advantage for large
organizations.
In a sector with high concentration in some segments,64 that has
already suffered from a large drop in investment in recent years,65 and
60See, for example, GDPR, Articles 12, 13, 24, 30, 35 and 37.
61Chivot and Castro (n 4).
62For example, Microsoft had 1600 engineers working on GDPR compliance since its enactment in 2016.
Julie Brill, ‘Microsoft’s Commitment to GDPR, Privacy and Putting Customers in Control of Their Own
Data’ (Microsoft Blog, 21 May 2018) <https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2018/05/21/
microsofts-commitment-to-gdpr-privacy-and-putting-customers-in-control-of-their-own-data/>.
63Kottasová (n 4).
64Concentration is particularly high at the publisher ad server level where Google is likely to have above
90% market share. Concentration is also significant at the DSP and SSP levels, where Google has
market share of 50–60%. See CMA Final Report, para 5.213.
65See Madhumita Murgia, ‘Adtech Funding Drops in Face of Facebook-Google duopoly’ Financial Times (3
January 2017) <www.ft.com/content/c4c358ca-c6af-11e6-8f29-9445cac8966f>; Ronan Shields, ‘Invest-
ment in Ad Tech Grows Increasingly Scarce, With Forrester Predicting a 75% Drop in Venture Capital’
Adweek (7 November 2018) <www.adweek.com/programmatic/investment-in-ad-tech-grows-
increasingly-scarce-with-forrester-predicting-a-75-drop-in-venture-capital/>; Nick Chasinov, ‘How Ad
Tech Entrepreneurs Can Combat Google and Facebook’s Dominance’ (22 January 2019) <www.
entrepreneur.com/article/326591>; Ricardo Bilton, ‘Venture Capital Gives Ad Tech the Cold Shoulder’
Digiday (29 October 2015) <https://digiday.com/media/venture-capital-gives-ad-tech-cold-shoulder/
>; Megan Rose Dickey, ‘Advertising Giants Leave Little Room for Adtech Startups, and VCs are Noticing’
Tech Crunch (14 June 2017) <https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/13/advertising-giants-leave-little-room-
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has seen several ad tech players struggling or even exiting the market,66
the additional costs generated by the GDPR could further precipitate
market concentration. While a large company has no difficulty to
absorb the compliance costs of GDPR, the situation may be different
for market players that are already struggling to make money and
attract investment.67 The anticipated compliance costs of the GDPR
could also delay or discourage market entry by making it more costly
and risky, hence depriving advertisers and publishers of new and
innovative tools, as well as the competitive pressure they would bring
on Google.
This imbalance is further aggravated by the uncertainty surrounding
the GDPR. For instance, immediately after the entry into force of the
GDPR, numerous independent ad exchanges and other vendors in the
ad tech ecosystem saw their ad demand volumes shrink dramatically
between 20 and 40%.68 The text of the GDPR left open a number of ques-
tions and authorities had not clarified fundamental issues, such as what
legal basis is appropriate in the context of online advertising, how to
for-adtech-startups-and-vcs-are-noticing/>; Claire Ballentine, ‘Google-Facebook Dominance Hurts Ad
Tech Firms, Speeding Consolidation’ The New York Times (12 August 2018) <www.nytimes.com/
2018/08/12/technology/google-facebook-dominance-hurts-ad-tech-firms-speeding-consolidation.
html>.
66The challenges faced by ad tech companies such as Sizmek, Rocket Fuel, The Rubicon Project, OpenX
and Verizon Media have been widely reported in the press. Sizmek filed for bankruptcy in 2019 and
parts of its business were eventually acquired by Amazon. See Nico Neumann, ‘The Sizmek Saga Under-
scores Ad Tech’s Flaws and Market Weaknesses’ (AdExchanger, 4 April 2019) <www.adexchanger.com/
data-driven-thinking/the-sizmek-saga-underscores-ad-techs-flaws-and-market-weaknesses/>. In 2018
Verizon announced it would write down Verizon Media (previously known as Oath, a company
formed after the merger of AOL and Yahoo) by $4.6 billion, cutting its goodwill valuation to half.
See ‘Verizon Media Group Revenue Falls; Finance Brands Spend More on Social’ (AdExchanger, 24
April 2019) <https://adexchanger.com/ad-exchange-news/wednesday-04242019/>; Simon Owens,
‘Verizon Made a $9 Billion Bet on Digital Media. Here’s Why It Failed’ (Intelligencer, 13 December
2018) <http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/12/why-verizons-usd9-billion-bet-on-digital-content-
failed.html>. In December 2018 OpenX laid off 100 employees and announced it would shut down
its ad server in 2019. See Sarah Sluis, ‘OpenX Lays off 100 Employees and Pivots to Video’ (AdExchanger,
18 December 2018) <https://adexchanger.com/platforms/openx-lays-off-100-employees-and-pivots-
to-video/>. In 2018 The Rubicon Project reported a 57% drop in quarterly revenues and fired 100
employees. See Ronan Shields, ‘Rubicon Project axes 100 staff as it counts the cost of killing its
buy-side fees as quarterly revenue drops 57%’ (The Drum, 14 March 2018) <www.thedrum.com/
news/2018/03/14/rubicon-project-axes-100-staff-it-counts-the-cost-killing-its-buy-side-fees>. In 2017
Rocket Fuel was acquired at a fraction of its initial valuation. See Mike Shields, ‘Ad Tech Company
Rocket Fuel Sold for a Fraction of Its Peak $2 Billion Valuation, and It Marks the End of an Era’ (Business
Insider, 18 July 2017) <www.businessinsider.com/rocket-fuels-sale-to-sizmek-marks-the-end-of-an-era-
in-ad-tech-2017-7>. See also Archie Sharma, ‘At-Tech Exits’ OpenX, 19 July 2016 <www.openx.com/uk_
en/resources/blog/62042/>.
67See Hannah Kuchler, ‘US Small Businesses Drop EU Customers Over New Data Rule’ Financial Times (24
May 2018) (“Tech start-ups, video games makers and advertising technology businesses are among
several small US companies pulling out of the EU rather than risk falling foul of the new General
Data Protection Regulation, which comes into force on Friday”).
68Jessica Davies, ‘“The Google Data Protection Regulation”: GDPR is Strafing Ad Sellers’ (Digiday, 4 June
2018) <https://digiday.com/media/google-data-protection-regulation-gdpr-strafing-ad-sellers/>.
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obtain user consent or who can be considered as a controller or processor
in the complex online advertising ecosystem, which ultimately benefitted
Google as advertisers decided to fly to safety. Regulatory uncertainty may
further penalize small and medium-size ad tech vendors when DPAs are
not responsive to the need for clarity on some opaque areas of the
GDPR.69
However, the shift in demand towards Google products was not only
the result of advertisers trusting that it is better placed to ensure compli-
ance. It was also heavily incited by Google’s position in the wake of the
GDPR. Google interpreted the GDPR as requiring consent as the
lawful basis for data processing activities in the ad tech ecosystem and
it thus required advertisers using Google’s ad tech products to only
buy through its own ad tech products for which it could guarantee that
it has valid user consent.70
2. Rightly or wrongly, large platforms benefit from advertiser trust
The fear of liability and the large fines that can be imposed on the basis of
the GDPR have led advertisers to concentrate their ad spending on the
largest players, as they trust that they are compliant with its regulatory
requirements.71 Since the entry into force of the GDPR, Google and Face-
book’s position in online advertising has been further strengthened.72
Trust in these players follows from three assumptions. First, that such
companies have the resources to comply with the GDPR. Second, that
companies holding vast amounts of data will be closely monitored by
regulatory authorities and thus will be compliant. Third, that such com-
panies will be more careful with users’ personal data as they have more to
lose in case of non-compliance. For reasons that will be discussed below,
the second and third of these assumptions are not necessarily true in
practice.
69See, for example, Olivier Magnan-Saurin, ‘La CNIL, nous a toueR’ (Medium, 5 February 2020) <https://
medium.com/@olivier.magnan.saurin/la-cnil-nous-a-tuer-6b982601eeec>.
70Davies (n 68).
71Nick Kostov and Sam Schechner, ‘GDPR Has Been a Boon for Google and Facebook’ The Wall Street
Journal (17 June 2019) <www.wsj.com/articles/gdpr-has-been-a-boon-for-google-and-facebook-
11560789219>. In fact, the trust that large players are GDPR compliant is ironic, considering the
numerous investigations into GDPR violations by Google and Facebook which have affected millions
of users, in particular with regards to the lack of transparency, inadequate information and lack of valid
consent regarding the processing of users’ personal data for advertising purposes.
72Mark Scott, Laurens Cerulus and Laura Kayali, ‘Six Months in, Europe’s Privacy Revolution Favors Google,
Facebook’ (Politico, 23 November 2018) <www.politico.eu/article/gdpr-facebook-google-privacy-data-
6-months-in-europes-privacy-revolution-favors-google-facebook/>; Cale Guthrie Weissman, ‘One Year
in, GDPR Seems to have Helped Google & Facebook’ (FastCompany, 17 May 2019) <www.fastcompany.
com/90351655/gdpr-helps-google-and-facebook-grow-uk-market-share-in-2019>.
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3. It is easier for large platforms to obtain user consent
The strengthened data protection framework set out by the GDPR has
made it harder for small and medium-size players to collect and use
data. Privacy-aware consumers might be hesitant to give consent to the
processing of their data to market players they do not necessarily know
– especially when seeing that their data might be used for a variety of pur-
poses, such as advertising and measurement.
On the contrary, the leading position of large platforms like Google
and Facebook in consumer-facing services perceived as “must-have”
allows them to easily obtain users’ consent to the collection of personal
data.73 For instance, billions of people are dependent on Google’s services,
such asGmail, Search, YouTube and the likes, which they consider an indis-
pensable part of their personal or even professional life – a part that they do
not consider letting go. Evidence shows that about half of all Internet users
and about two thirds of users aged 14–29 classify Google Search as “absol-
utely essential”.74 While some users are unhappy about the way consent is
sought – for example, that it is often a take-it-or-leave-it approach or that it
is too cumbersome to read all relevant notices – the perceived essential
nature of the services provided by Google, combined with the lack of cred-
ible alternatives, outweigh their concerns about their data being collected.75
Moreover, in the case of logged-in environments (e.g. Android or
Facebook), user consent needs only be obtained once, when the user is
required to accept the terms and conditions in order to use the service.
In contrast, outside the “walled gardens”, user consent must be obtained
each time a user visits a publisher or advertiser’s website. Users faced with
repetitive requests to consent to the collection and processing of their
data are more likely to refuse granting the required consent. Additionally,
the fragmentation of consent in the open web hampers the business of ad
tech vendors which must ensure that user consent has been obtained in
various touchpoints, in order to be able to provide their services without
infringing data protection laws.
4. Limiting the ability to share data also helps large platforms
The GDPR has considerably limited data sharing between companies, by
requiring free, specific, informed and unambiguous consent for data
73Jon Markman, ‘GDPR is Great News for Google and Facebook, Really’ (Forbes, 22 May 2018) <www.
forbes.com/sites/jonmarkman/2018/05/22/gdpr-is-great-news-for-google-and-facebook-really/
#fac153448f63>.
74Anne Niedermann, ‘Freely-Given and Informed Consent? The User’s Perspective’ Presentation of the
Results of the Allensbach Survey, DLD Europe, 9 September 2019.
75ibid.
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transfers, as well as by requiring the data supplier to monitor and follow
the data transferred – as the data collector must ensure that data are only
used in accordance with the data subject’s consent and that the data
subject can exercise its rights (such as the right to erasure) – and by
imposing liability in cases of violation of the GDPR.76 Data sharing is
therefore risky and many data holders may decide to take the extreme
measure of refusing to share their data with smaller ad tech players as
they may not trust their ability to comply with the GDPR. This is proble-
matic as these smaller actors are generally the ones that would benefit the
most from accessing third-party data.
In contrast, there is limited incremental value from data transfers for
large market actors holding massive amounts of data, as they already
capture the data they need within their ecosystem. At the same time,
when entities decide to engage in data sharing, they prefer to deal with
large market actors, whom they trust to comply with the GDPR. This
may create a competitive advantage for large, well-known players, as
smaller suppliers or new entrants will often be overlooked. The limit-
ations to data sharing have therefore widened the gap between Google
and Facebook and small players, making the former much more attrac-
tive to advertisers who value the amount of data they possess.
5. The one-stop-shop mechanism benefits companies located in
friendly jurisdictions
The one-stop-shop system envisaged in the GDPR means that compa-
nies have to deal with only one DPA – the supervisory authority of
their single or main establishment. It moreover entails that investi-
gations into the likes of Google or Facebook will be typically controlled
by the same few authorities, where the largest tech firms are established
in the EU. This creates serious bottlenecks which, coupled with the
reluctancy of certain DPAs to intervene, results in tech giants escaping
close monitoring and liability, despite regularly engaging in dubious
practices.77
76Consider, for example, that the controller must, at the time when personal data is obtained from the
data subject, inform the data subject of any recipients or categories of recipients of the personal data
(GDPR, Article 13(1)(c)). Additionally, if the data subject exercises his or her right of access, the control-
ler must be able to inform him or her of the recipients or categories of recipient to whom the data
personal data have been or will be disclosed (GDPR, Article 15(1)(c)) and if the data subject wants
to exercise his or her right to erasure, the controller must inform other controllers which are processing
such data (GDPR, Article 17(2)).
77Nicholas Vinocur, ‘“We Have a Huge Problem”: European Tech Regulator Despairs over Lack of Enforce-
ment’ (Politico, 27 December 2019) <www.politico.com/news/2019/12/27/europe-gdpr-technology-
regulation-089605>.
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In recent years, an upheaval against the practices of Big Tech has been
observed. Campaigns have been organized across the EU by civil rights
organizations urging authorities to take the risks of RTB seriously.78
Commentators have strongly criticized Google’s data practices, in
particular Google tracking users’ location or granting third parties with
access to (often sensitive) user data.79 Google’s practices have also led
to numerous complaints submitted to DPAs across Europe since the
entry into force of the GDPR,80 which claim, inter alia, that Google vio-
lates the purpose limitation principle with its “internal data free-for-all”
practices and by tracking users’ location.81
78See, for example, Eva Simon, ‘Prevent the Online Ad Industry from Misusing Your Data – Join the #Stop-
SpyingOnUs Campaign’ (Liberties EU, 4 June 2019) <www.liberties.eu/en/campaigns/stop-spying-on-
us-fix-ad-tech-campaign/307>; Fix AdTech, ‘A Campaign to Make Online Advertising Work Better
and Safer’ <https://fixad.tech/about/>.
79See, for example, Laura Hautala and Richard Nieva, ‘Google’s Gmail Controversy is Everything People
Hate About Silicon Valley’ (CNET, 3 July 2018) <www.cnet.com/news/googles-gmail-controversy-is-
everything-wrong-with-silicon-valley/>; Sarah McDermott, ‘Android Phones Still Track You When
Location Services are Off’ (CNET, 21 November 2017) <www.cnet.com/news/android-phones-still-
track-you-when-location-services-are-off/>; Ryan Nakashima, ‘AP Exclusive: Google Tracks Your Move-
ments, Like It or Not’ (14 August 2018) <https://apnews.com/828aefab64d4411bac257a07c1af0ecb>;
Natasha Lomas, ‘Mental Health Websites in Europe Found Sharing User Data for Ads’ (Tech Crunch, 4
September 2019) <https://techcrunch.com/2019/09/04/mental-health-websites-in-europe-found-
sharing-user-data-for-ads/>; DJ Pangburn, ‘How – and Why – Apple, Google, and Facebook Follow
You Around in Real Life’ (Fast Company, 22 December 2017) <www.fastcompany.com/40477441/
facebook-google-apple-know-where-you-are>.
80Under the GDPR, each data subject can decide to lodge a complaint with the supervisory authority in
the Member State of its habitual residence, place of work or place of the alleged infringement (GDPR,
Article 77). However, when cross-border processing takes place, the role of the lead supervisory auth-
ority is central. DPAs other than the DPA of the main or the single establishment of the controller or
processor that receive the complaints shall notify the lead supervisory authority about such com-
plaints, which then decides whether it will handle the case or delegate it (GDPR, Article 56). When
the lead authority decides to handle the case, it will have the leading role in the investigations,
being the main point of contact for the company and drafting the decision which will be submitted
to the supervisory authorities concerned. In other words, even though complaints against e.g. Google
and Facebook, can be submitted (and have been submitted) to DPAs across the EU, ultimately it is
Ireland that has control over these companies (GDPR, Article 60).
81For example, in November 2018, seven consumer organizations filed complaints against Google with
the DPAs in Norway, the Netherlands, Greece, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland and Sweden, noti-
fying of breaches of the GDPR in relation to how Google tracks – and monetizes through online adver-
tising – its users’ location. Moreover, in September 2018 Dr Johnny Ryan of Brave, Jim Killock of the
Open Rights Group and Michael Veale of University College London filed simultaneous complaints
to the UK and the Irish DPAs against Google and other ad tech firms notifying regulators of a
massive and ongoing data breach in the context of behavioural advertising that affects virtually
every user on the internet. See Privacy International, ‘Regulatory Complaint Against Google and
Other “Ad Tech” Companies Under Europe’s GDPR by Johnny Ryan, Jim Killock, and Michael Veale’
(12 September 2018) <https://privacyinternational.org/examples/2983/regulatory-complaint-against-
google-and-other-ad-tech-companies-under-europes-gdpr>. In January 2019, a new complaint was
filed to the Polish DPA, accompanied by new evidence on the massive leakage of special categories
of user data that takes place in the RTB process. See Privacy International, ‘Panoptykon Foundation
Files Complaint Against Google and Other “Ad Tech” Companies with the with the Polish Data Protec-
tion Authority’ (28 January 2019) <https://privacyinternational.org/examples/2982/panoptykon-
foundation-files-complaint-against-google-and-other-ad-tech-companies>. In May 2019, GDPR com-
plaints regarding RTB where filed with DPAs in Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg,
bringing the total of complaints on this matter to seven to mark one year of the GDPR. See Privacy
International, ‘Ad Tech GDPR Complaint is Extended to Four More European Regulators’ (20 May
EUROPEAN COMPETITION JOURNAL 23
As a result of the one-stop-shop principle, Google falls under the super-
vision of the Irish Data Protection Commission (“DPC”). However, the
DPC, which oversees, among other giants, Google, Facebook, Microsoft
and Twitter, has long been criticized for catering to the very companies
it is supposed to oversee, by not actively seeking to monitor compliance,
undertake investigations or impose fines for GDPR violations.82 There
is a practical reason behind that; the case load of the DPC is horrifying.
Since 25 May 2018, the DPC has received more than 8.800 complaints
under the GDPR, has had more than 9.600 data security breaches
notified to it and it has received 593 cross-border processing complaints
via the GDPR’s one-stop-shop mechanism.83 With a decelerating
budget84 and a staff limited to 140 regulatory lawyers, investigators and
technologists,85 it is not surprising that the DPC is overwhelmed.
However, it is also a matter of willingness to enforce the GDPR and
punish violators. In fact, besides being completely overwhelmed, one poss-
ible reason which may explain the passive stance of the DPC relates to the
strong economic dependency that exists between Ireland and the tech
giants. This dependency may disincentivize rigorous GDPR enforcement
against these companies, raising the question of whether Ireland is best-
suited for regulating Big Tech.86 It is indeed surprising that despite the
numerous complaints against Google and Facebook, the Irish DPA only
opened its first investigation into Google one year after the entry into
2019) <https://privacyinternational.org/examples/2992/ad-tech-gdpr-complaint-extended-four-more-
european-regulators>. In March 2020, Brave filed another complaint against Google with the Irish
DPC arguing that Google’s internal data “free-for-all” practices are in violation of the GDPR. At the
same time, Brave wrote to the European Commission, the Bundeskartellamt, the UK Competition &
Markets Authority, the French Autorité de la concurrence and the Irish Competition and Consumer Pro-
tection Commission to make them aware of this purpose limitation complaint. See Johnny Ryan,
‘Formal GDPR Complaint Against Google’s Internal Data Free-for-All’ (16 March 2020) <https://
brave.com/google-internal-data-free-for-all/>.
82Nicholas Vinocur, ‘How One Country Blocks the World on Data Privacy’ (Politico, 24 April 2019) <www.
politico.com/story/2019/04/24/ireland-data-privacy-1270123>.
83See Irish Data Protection Commission, ‘Annual Report: 25 May–31 December 2018’ <www.
dataprotection.ie/sites/default/files/uploads/2019-02/DPC%20Annual%20Report%2025%20May%
20-%2031%20December%202018.pdf>; Irish Data Protection Commission, ‘Annual Report: 1 January–
31 December 2019’ <www.dataprotection.ie/sites/default/files/uploads/2020-02/DPC%20Annual%
20Report%202019.pdf>.
84The Irish DPA’s budget stands at €16.9 million and is the sixth among DPAs in Europe. Despite seeking
a budget increase of €5.9 million, it only got a third of that amount. The chair of the Irish DPC said she
was “frustrated by the budget restrictions” and graded Ireland’s performance as an “A for effort” but a
“C-plus/B-minus in terms of output”. See Adam Satariano, ‘Europe’s Privacy Law Hasn’t Shown Its
Teeth, Frustrating Advocates’ The New York Times (27 April 2020) <www.nytimes.com/2020/04/27/
technology/GDPR-privacy-law-europe.html>.
85In fact, Google and Facebook’s lead authority only has 21 specialist tech investigators. See Brave,
‘Europe’s Governments Are Failing the GDPR: Brave’s 2020 Report on the Enforcement Capacity of
Data Protection Authorities’ (April 2020) page 7 <https://brave.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/
Brave-2020-DPA-Report.pdf>.
86Vinocur, ‘“We Have a Huge Problem”: European’ (n 77).
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force of the GDPR.87 It is also surprising that Ireland continues taking a
softer approach in its investigations, by avoiding on-site inspections and
sanctions, opting for negotiations with the companies instead.88
At the same time, DPAs in other EU Member States – and particularly
in France – have zealously enforced the GDPR. The CNIL did not waste
any time and already issued formal warnings on ad tech companies a
month after the entry into force of the GDPR, forcing companies to
devote months of work both on GDPR compliance and on liaising
with their supervisory authority.89 For instance, in July 2018, the CNIL
issued formal warnings to two small local ad tech companies, Fidzup
and Teemo, stating that their data processing for targeted advertising
did not rely on valid consent. First, the CNIL alleged the companies
did not provide data subjects with the information required under the
GDPR, as such information was provided only after users’ geolocation
data and advertising ID were already collected. Moreover, Fidzup’s
privacy policy was found to be incomplete as it did not mention targeted
advertising or the details of the data controller. In addition, the CNIL
claimed consent to processing by Fidzup and Teemo was neither freely
given nor specific, as consent for the deployment of their tool (the
“SDK-tool”) and the processing of geolocation data for targeted advertis-
ing was bundled with consent obtained for other data processing activi-
ties of the app provider. The CNIL also found that Teemo was keeping
geolocation data for longer than necessary.90
Fidzup was a successful enforcement story according to the CNIL.
After months of work (and after having its initial proposal rejected by
the CNIL), Fidzup managed to get the green light from the CNIL with
regards to its processing activities, after having found a solution that
was acceptable both by the CNIL and Fidzup’s business partners.91 But
in reality, it drove Fidzup out of business. According to its founder, the
87Padraic Halpin, ‘Irish Regulator Opens First Privacy Probe into Google’ (Reuters, 22 May 2019) <www.
reuters.com/article/google-dataprotection/irish-regulator-opens-first-privacy-probe-into-google>.
88For example, despite numerous investigations into Facebook’s practices, the Irish DPA has not sent any
regulatory agents to Facebook’s Dublin headquarters, choosing to rely on “updates” by Facebook that
reveal little more than the company’s public statements. See Vinocur, ‘How One Country Blocks the
World on Data Privacy’ (n 82).
89CNIL, ‘Applications mobiles: mises en demeure pour absence de consentement au traitement de




91CNIL, ‘Applications mobiles: clôture des mises en demeure à l’encontre des sociétés FIDZUP et SINGLE-
SPOT’ (29 November 2018) <www.cnil.fr/fr/applications-mobiles-cloture-des-mises-en-demeure-
lencontre-des-societes-fidzup-et-singlespot>. See also ‘GDPR: Fidzup, an Exemplary Case’ (7 March
2019) <www.altavia-group.com/en/21st-century-shopper/gdpr-fidzup-an-exemplary-case/>.
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lack of effective cooperation by CNIL (which prolonged the duration of
the proceedings), combined with the fact that the CNIL made the pro-
cedures public (causing distrust among Fidzup’s customers), effectively
killed his promising start-up.92
But for the one-stop-shop system, the CNIL could have better used its
resources looking at the questionable practices of Google (as discussed
below), hence ensuring a more effective and unbiased enforcement of
the GDPR in Europe, than going after small ad tech vendors whose prac-
tices, even if problematic, could only produce limited effects given their
size. In this respect, the CNIL has made it clear that it is more than
willing to investigate Google for breaches of the GDPR. In January
2019, the CNIL imposed a € 50 million fine on Google for lack of trans-
parency, inadequate information and lack of valid consent regarding ads
personalization, but it had jurisdiction to do so only because the “one-
stop-shop mechanism” was not applicable to the particular investigation,
as Google could not yet be considered to have a main establishment in the
EU.93
Finally, DPAs across Europe have endorsed diverse interpretations of
the GDPR, with some – particularly the CNIL – adopting a stricter
approach than other DPAs. For example, the CNIL has interpreted the
requirement of freely given consent under the GDPR when the use of
cookies or other trackers is involved as necessitating data collectors to
afford data subjects
the ability to express refusal as easily as indeed the counterpart of the ability to
express free consent. Therefore, in order not to affect the user’s freedom of
choice, the mechanism for expressing consent should be presented at the
same level and in the same technical manner as the mechanism for expressing
refusal.94
Put simply, the user must have a clear choice between to “accept” and
“refuse” or to “consent” and to “not consent”. The CNIL’s interpretation
goes beyond the interpretation adopted by the Irish DPC, which requires
data collectors using an “accept” button to give equal prominence to a
92Magnan-Saurin (n 69).
93CNIL, ‘The CNIL’s Restricted Committee Imposes a Financial Penalty of 50 Million Euros Against Google
LLC’ (21 January 2019) <www.cnil.fr/en/cnils-restricted-committee-imposes-financial-penalty-50-
million-euros-against-google-llc>.
94CNIL, ‘Draft Recommendation on the Practical Procedures for Collecting the Consent Provided for in
Article 82 of the French Data Protection Act, Concerning Operations of Storing or Gaining Access to
Information in the Terminal Equipment of a User (Recommendation “Cookies and other trackers”)’
(14 January 2020) para 35 <www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/draft_recommendation_
cookies_and_other_trackers_en.pdf>.
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“reject” button or to a “manage cookies” button, bringing data subjects to
another layer of information in order to allow them to manage cookies,
by cookie type and purpose. What matters for the DPC is that the user is
not nudged into accepting cookies over rejecting them.95
As a result, data subjects are more likely to reject the use of cookies by
companies regulated by the CNIL (as an explicit “reject button” must be
available) than companies regulated by the DPAs adopting an approach
similar to that of the Irish DPC (as data subjects might only have the
opportunity to reject cookies at the second information layer). Given
the importance of cookies in the ad tech ecosystem, the approach
adopted by the CNIL places ad tech actors in a competitive disadvantage
compared to their counterparts regulated by other DPAs. If they comply
with the CNIL’s stringent consent requirements, they might suffer
revenue losses as a result of their reduced ability to track users. If they
do not comply, they risk investigations and fines for practices that
more lenient DPAs might consider compliant with the GDPR.96 Even
though the GDPR was aimed at levelling the playing field across the
EU, data controllers remain subject to different consent requirements
depending on their place of establishment.
6. Has the GDPR increased market concentration? Some empirical data
For the reasons discussed in the preceding sections, the GDPR appears to
benefit Google, a player that is already dominating the ad tech markets.
One challenging issue, however, is to quantify the impact of the GDPR
on market concentration in the advertising sector. A couple of recent
empirical studies suggest that the short-run impact of the GDPR was
indeed increased market concentration. For instance, in their paper ana-
lysing the impact of the GDPR on web technology vendors, Johnson and
Shiver show that the highest impact on such vendors both in terms of
market shares and concentration ratio was felt in the advertising cat-
egory.97 Similarly, in their paper analysing the impact of the GDPR on
95Irish Data Protection Commission, ‘Guidance Note: Cookies and Other Tracking Technologies’ (April
2020) page 9 <www.dataprotection.ie/sites/default/files/uploads/2020-04/Guidance%20note%20on
%20cookies%20and%20other%20tracking%20technologies.pdf>.
96The GDPR has granted DPAs across Europe significant enforcement powers, including the power to
impose fines up to €20 million or 4% of a company’s global annual turnover, whichever higher.
Given the grave economic implications these fines can have, especially for small and medium-size
companies, it would be responsible for DPAs to conduct an impact assessment prior to adopting
any recommendations or guidelines interpreting the GDPR and setting out their approach to GDPR
enforcement. In this regard, they should consider the broader economic consequences of any
interpretation of data protection rules, as well as any effects on competition in the online advertising
market.
97See Johnson and Shiver (n 14).
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web technology services, Peukert et al. show that “[w]ith the introduction
of GDPR, the dominant firm in many markets for web technologies,
Google, increases its market share whereas all other firms that supply
web technology either do not see a change in market share or suffer
losses”.98 They also find that among the service categories analysed in
their paper, Google’s largest market share increases where in the analytics
market (7.2%) and the advertising market (4.5%).99 These papers thus
suggest that the GDPR does have an effect on market concentration
and competition in the advertising field.
IV. The GDPR may not prevent criticizable data accumulation
and processing practices
As we have seen in Part III, the GDPR imposes heavy compliance costs
on small and medium-size ad tech vendors and the various restrictions it
contains tend to favour large digital platforms like Google, hence increas-
ing market concentration. That problem is accentuated by the one-stop-
shop principle with the companies engaged in the largest data collection
and processing operations being generally located in “friendly” jurisdic-
tions, such as Ireland, where the level of oversight has so far been
inadequate.
In this Part, we analyse what we perceive as a key shortcoming of the
way the GDPR has been interpreted so far, which is that while DPAs have
imposed limits on external data transfers (data transfers between different
companies), they have not done anything to limit any internal data
sharing within various units of large digital platforms. This inadequate
enforcement of GDPR’s purpose limitation principle not only constitutes
a major threat to user privacy, but also places large, dominant platforms,
which can combine consent requirements for all their data uses, in a com-
petitive advantage.
For example, Facebook’s data policy allows it to combine extensive
user data it collects directly from its user-facing products such as Face-
book, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger,100 as well as from its
Business Tools101 – including Facebook’s social plugins, Facebook
98See Peukert et al. (n 15) 2.
99ibid 20.
100For an overview of the Facebook Products see ‘What are the Facebook Products?’ Facebook Help
Centre <www.facebook.com/help/1561485474074139>.
101See ‘The Facebook Business Tools’ Facebook Help Centre <www.facebook.com/help/
331509497253087>. For information regarding APIs and SDKs see ‘APIs and SDKs’ Facebook for Devel-
opers <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/apis-and-sdks>. For information on the Facebook Pixel
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Login, its APIs and SDKs, or the Facebook pixel – to (i) “provide, person-
alize and improve” its products, (ii) “provide measurement, analytics and
other business services”, (iii) “promote safety, integrity and security”, (iv)
communicate with the user, and (v) “research and innovate for social
good”.102 Facebook now plans to integrate WhatsApp, Instagram and
Facebook Messenger, a move that, if materialized, would allow Facebook
to combine the data it has collected from the billions of users of these sep-
arate platforms.103
Similarly, in 2012, Google consolidated more than 60 separate privacy
policies into a single policy, in order to “create a beautifully simple, intui-
tive user experience across Google” and allegedly in response to regula-
tors “calling for shorter, simpler privacy policies”.104 As a result of this
change, Google can combine the data it collects across its user-facing ser-
vices (e.g. YouTube, Search, Maps) which it can use for a wide variety of
purposes, including product improvement and, of course, online adver-
tising.105 Users have only limited ability to opt-out of having their data
generated from one service (e.g. Maps) being used for another Google
service (e.g. YouTube).106 In 2016, Google changed its privacy policy
again so that it may also associate data collected across third-party
see ‘The Facebook Pixel’ Facebook for Business <www.facebook.com/business/learn/facebook-ads-
pixel>. For information regarding Social Plugins see ‘Social Plugins’ Facebook for Developers
<https://developers.facebook.com/docs/plugins>.
102Facebook, ‘Data Policy’ <www.facebook.com/policy.php>.
103‘Watchdog Collars Facebook Over Messenger Merger Plan’ (Decision Marketing, 29 January 2019)
<www.decisionmarketing.co.uk/news/watchdog-collars-facebook-over-messenger-merger-plan>.
This announcement has been strongly contested by market players and authorities: Troy Wolverton,
‘Federal Regulators are Considering Blocking Facebook from Combining WhatsApp, Instagram and
Its Other Apps’ Business Insider (12 December 2019) <www.businessinsider.com/facebook-could-
face-an-injunction-from-the-ftc-2019-12>; Sissy Cao, ‘Mark Zuckerberg’s Plan to Merge All Facebook
Apps Draws 4th Antitrust Probe’ Observer (17 January 2020) <https://observer.com/2020/01/
facebook-mark-zuckerberg-antitrust-lawsuit-over-merging-instagram-whasapp-messenger/>. This
plan has moreover caused significant “internal strife” and has allegedly been part of the reason
why Instagram and WhatsApp’s founders left the company. See Mike Isaac, ‘Zuckerberg Plans to Inte-
grate WhatsApp, Instagram and Facebook Messenger’ The New York Times (25 January 2019) <www.
nytimes.com/2019/01/25/technology/facebook-instagram-whatsapp-messenger.html>.
104Alma Whitten, ‘Updating Our Privacy Policies and Terms of Service’ (Google Official Blog, 24 January
2012) <https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/updating-our-privacy-policies-and-terms.html>.
105ibid; see, also, Leena Rao, ‘Google Consolidates Privacy Policy; Will Combine User Data Across Services’
(Tech Crunch, 24 January 2012) <https://techcrunch.com/2012/01/24/google-consolidates-privacy-
policy-will-combine-user-data-across-services/>.
106To the authors’ best knowledge, there seems to be no way for users to prevent Google from using
data generated from one service to improve other services or develop new services. The only
control users have is to disable ‘personalized advertising’ so that they will not be targeted with per-
sonalized ads (see <https://myaccount.google.com/intro/data-and-personalization>). However, we
note that this is a specific use case limitation relating to targeting. Nowhere does Google state that
it will not use data collected from one service to perform non-targeting advertising functions on
other services, such as frequency capping or attribution.
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websites (e.g. through DoubleClick cookies) with personal Google
Accounts.107
Yet this “internal data free-for-all” is problematic, at least for two
reasons.108 First, it enables the creation of unique user super-profiles,
allowing large platforms such as Google and Facebook to obtain a panop-
tic view of Internet users. This represents a major threat for user
privacy.109 Worse, Google and Facebook use these data for a number
of unspecific data processing activities. These platforms often use vague
terms in their privacy policies, stating that they use data to “provide
their services”, “maintain and improve their services”, “develop new ser-
vices”, “provide personalized services, including content and ads”,
“measure performance”, “promote safety, integrity and security”, etc.110
These general purposes do not conform with the purpose specification
component of the purpose limitation principle, which requires that pur-
poses be clearly and specifically identified.111 On the contrary, this
wording bears a strong resemblance with the examples of unlawful prac-
tice identified by the Article 29 Working Party in its Opinion on purpose
limitation.112
Moreover, once user data enter the “walled garden” of the platform,
they can be used internally in ways that are unknown to all but the plat-
form, due to the complete lack of transparency of how the latter’s proces-
sing activities operate. For example, Google has built a complex system,
which is extremely difficult if not impossible to navigate, with users being
lost in links to external policies and procedures, vague language and
insufficient information on the uses of data.113 In fact, a detailed examin-
ation of Google’s numerous privacy-related sources and documents
unveils that Google uses hundreds of purposes to justify its data proces-
sing activities instead of the six identified legal bases of Article 6(1) of the
107Julia Angwin, ‘Google Has Quietly Dropped Ban on Personally Identifiable Web Tracking’ (ProPublica,
21 October 2016) <www.propublica.org/article/google-has-quietly-dropped-ban-on-personally-
identifiable-web-tracking>.
108Submission of Johnny Ryan from Brave to the CMA in response to the CMA’s Interim report on online
platforms and digital advertising, 12 February 2020 <https://brave.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/
12-February-2020-Brave-response-to-CMA.pdf>.
109See also Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour in the matter of Google/Dou-
bleClick, F.T.C. File No. 071-0170; Dina Srinivasan, ‘The Antitrust Case against Facebook’ (2018) 16(1)
Berkeley Business Law Journal <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3247362>.
110Google, ‘Privacy Policy: Why Google Collects data’ <https://policies.google.com/privacy#whycollect>;
Facebook, ‘Data Policy’ <www.facebook.com/policy.php>.
111See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 03/2013 on Purpose Limitation’ (n 33).
112ibid 15; See also Complaint to the Irish Data Protection Commission, Dr Johny Ryan v 1. Google Ireland
Limited 2. Google LLC <https://brave.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Purpose-Limitation-Google.
pdf>.
113See in this regard id., pages 11 et seq.
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GDPR.114 The result is that Google benefits from what has been aptly
described as an “internal data free-for-all”, by ignoring a core GDPR
principle, hence obtaining a considerable competitive advantage over
companies which act in compliance with the GDPR and which do not
have such a market position and a diversified portfolio of consumer-
facing products.
Second, this cross-usage of data may enable a dominant platform to
engage in anticompetitive conduct by “enveloping” new markets while
entrenching its market power in its core market.115 At a high level, this
envelopment strategy works as follows: a platform dominant in one
market (the “origin market”, e.g. Google in the general search market)
enters a new platform market (the “target market”, e.g. the market for
flights search) with overlap among potential users and offers its service
for free to all sides of the market. It recoups such service through data
cross-usage, i.e. data generated in the target market is combined with
data in the origin market and used there, e.g. to improve the service or
inform advertising served in the origin market. This strategy has the
potential to exclude a competitor from the target market as it forms a
credible predatory mechanism. At the same time, it prevents competitors
in the target market from gaining data superiority and entering the origin
market. The platform has the incentive to repeat this strategy again and
again in the hunt for more data, conquering new markets while further
entrenching its position in the core market where it monetizes the col-
lected data. This strategy would not be possible if the platforms were
required to keep the data separate per service (data siloes) – or at the
very least, if users were by default opted out of having their data generated
from one service being used for another service.116
The concept of data siloes seems to have gained popularity among reg-
ulators. For instance, the Bundeskartellamt has adopted a pioneering
decision prohibiting Facebook from making access to its services con-
ditional on the user accepting that Facebook may combine user data
from its website, Facebook-owned services and third-party websites.117
The Bundeskartellamt requested Facebook to adapt its terms of use
114ibid.
115Daniele Condorelli and Jorge Padilla, ‘Harnessing Platform Envelopment Through Privacy Policy Tying’
(14 December 2019) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3504025>.
116In this case users would have to opt in in order for the platform to use the data generated from one
service for other services.
117Bundeskartellamt 6th Decision Division of 6 February 2019, B6-22/16 Administrative proceedings
against 1. Facebook Inc. 2. Facebook Ireland Ltd. 3. Facebook Deutschland GmbH 4. Verbraucherzen-
trale Bundesverband e.V <www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidung/EN/Entscheidungen/
Missbrauchsaufsicht/2019/B6-22-16.pdf>.
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and change its business model. Put simply, for the first time a compe-
tition watchdog ordered “internal unbundling” of data held by a domi-
nant platform, having carefully examined the anticompetitive effects of
the data practices of Facebook and recognizing that “[t]oday data are a
decisive factor in competition”.118 While in an appeal lodged by Face-
book, the Dusseldorf Higher Regional Court suspended the application
of the Bundeskartellamt’s decision,119 on appeal the German Supreme
Court sided with the competition authority.120 The remedy of data
siloes was also considered at length by the CMA in its Final Report on
its online platforms and digital advertising market study.121
V. GDPR and privacy considerations are used as a justification
for potentially restrictive conduct
In this Part we explain how, over the past couple of years, large platforms
have been increasingly invoking the GDPR or broader privacy consider-
ations to engage in practices that are prima facie problematic under com-
petition law. We examine how Google in particular has invoked privacy
to pull YouTube inventory from AdX (Section A), restrict portability of
the DoubleClick ID (Section B) and phase out support for third-party
cookies in Chrome (Section C). Google’s tactic raises serious concerns
and should be addressed by regulators (Section D).
As a preliminary remark, while in some of the cases examined below
Google has justified its conduct more broadly on “privacy concerns”
and not explicitly on the need to comply with the GDPR, there is little
doubt that the GDPR has shaped profoundly the modern privacy land-
scape. Consequently, any discussion of the latter without having regard
to the GDPR would be incomplete. As explained above, along with the
ePrivacy Directive, the GDPR provides the legal framework protecting
118Bundeskartellamt, ‘Bundeskartellamt Prohibits Facebook from Combining User Data from Different
Sources’ (7 February 2019) <www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/
2019/07_02_2019_Facebook.html>.
119See Natasha Lomas, ‘Facebook Succeeds in Blocking German FCO’s Privacy-Minded Order Against
Combining User Data’ (Tech Crunch, 26 August 2019) <https://techcrunch.com/2019/08/26/
facebook-succeeds-in-blocking-german-fcos-privacy-minded-order-against-combining-user-data/>;
Denis Schlimpert, ‘Victory for Facebook as Düsseldorf Court Suspends the Bundeskartellamt’s Decision’
(Lexology, 30 August 2019) <www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=eb62ca02-bc17-4757-8ede-
0dc8af0ec8b7>.
120Adam Satariano, ‘Facebook Loses Antitrust Decision in Germany Over Data Collection’ The New York
Times (23 June 2020) <www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/technology/facebook-antitrust-germany.html>.
121CMA Final Report, ‘Appendix Z: Assessment of Potential Data-Related Interventions in Digital Advertis-
ing Markets’ paras 129–64 <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5efc3f7ae90e075c5aeb99
47/Appendix_Z_-_Data_related_interventions_in_digital_advertising_markets.pdf>.
32 D. GERADIN ET AL.
the digital privacy of EU citizens. Meanwhile, the GDPR has served as a
model and a source of inspiration for non-EU countries wishing to
strengthen their citizens’ privacy.122 It is thus highly likely that the
various “privacy defences” put forward by platforms have been at least
partly influenced by GDPR considerations and the growing privacy
awareness this piece of legislation has brought to individuals and
companies.
As a further preliminary remark, it is noted that Google is not the only
platform invoking privacy considerations to justify otherwise controver-
sial practices. For example, Apple has also relied on privacy concerns to
engage in conduct that could harm competition.123 Most recently, several
trade associations in France filed a complaint with the French Autorite de
la concurrence against Apple over certain upcoming changes affecting
user tracking on iPhones, claiming the changes (which Apple has
portrayed as a win for user privacy) are anti-competitive.124 However,
for the purposes of the present paper, we chose to focus on Google’s
practices, given the latter’s position in online advertising. Even so, the
concerns we express over Google’s “privacy defences” could apply with
equal force to other platforms such as Apple.
A. Google’s decision to remove YouTube inventory from AdX
In 2015, Google decided to remove YouTube inventory from AdX,
cutting access to third-party DSPs such as TubeMogul or AppNexus.125
YouTube inventory may be purchased only directly from Google or
through its own buy-side software, namely Google Ads (at the time
called AdWords) and DV360 (at the time called DoubleClick Bid
122See Catherine Armitage, ‘GDPR: The Emergence of a Global Standard on Privacy?’ (World Federation of
Advertisers, 28 November 2018) <https://wfanet.org/knowledge/item/2018/11/28/GDPR-the-
emergence-of-a-global-standard-on-privacy>. The US is also considering adopting a federal privacy
legislation, while California has passed its own legislation, called California Consumer Privacy Act
(“CCPA”). See Peter M Lefkowitz, ‘Why America Needs a Thoughtful Federal Privacy Law’ (The
New York Times, 25 June 2019) <www.nytimes.com/2019/06/25/opinion/congress-privacy-law.
html>; ‘How the CCPA is Similar to the GDPR’ (TermsFeed, 23 April 2020) <www.termsfeed.com/
blog/ccpa-similar-gdpr/>.
123See e.g. Chance Miller, ‘Lawmakers Suggest Apple may be Using Privacy “as a Shield for Anti-Competi-
tive Behavior”’ (9to5Mac, 26 November 2019) <https://9to5mac.com/2019/11/26/apple-privacy-anti-
trust-concern/>.
124Keach Hagey and Patience Haggin, ‘Apple Faces Antitrust Complaint in France Over Privacy Changes
in iPhones’ (The Wall Street Journal, 28 October 2020) <www.wsj.com/articles/apple-faces-antitrust-
complaint-in-france-over-privacy-changes-in-iphones-11603893625>. The authors consult for the
complainants.
125Kelly Liyakasa, ‘Google to Yank YouTube Inventory Out of AdX By Year’s End’ (AdExchanger, 6 August
2015) <www.adexchanger.com/ad-exchange-news/google-to-yank-youtube-inventory-out-of-adx-by-
years-end/>.
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Manager). Rival DSPs reported serious harm as a result. For instance, in
his testimony before the US House Judiciary Committee in 2019,
AppNexus co-founder Brian O’Kelley submitted that
[t]his was a devastating move for AppNexus and other independent ad tech-
nology companies. […] Even WPP, our largest customer and largest investors,
had no choice but to start using Google’s technology. AppNexus growth
slowed, and we were forced to lay off 100 employees in 2016.126
The CMA expressed the concern that Google might have used the
importance of its own and operated inventory to strengthen its position
as a DSP provider.127 The fact that YouTube inventory is available only
through Google’s own DSPs was found to
affects advertisers’ choices of DSP for non-Google inventory as well because, as
discussed above, a single DSP is typically used for a given campaign. As a
result, advertisers who want to include YouTube inventory in their campaigns
have a strong incentive to use DV360 for the entire campaign. As we have seen
above, access to YouTube is one of the main reasons why advertisers choose
DV360; several DSPs submitted that exclusive access to YouTube provides a
very significant advantage to DV360 and creates a barrier to the growth of
competitors.128
Google’s initial counterargument was that third-party DSPs accounted
only for a small percentage of YouTube spend, and in any event some
other DSPs managed to attract advertisers despite the policy change.129
However, in its response to the CMA Interim Report, Google raised an
additional argument, namely user privacy:
[…] restricting third-party access both to our targeting data and our own
inventory (such as YouTube inventory) is the best way to maintain the
privacy of user information and prevent it from being leaked to potentially
malicious actors. Third-party DSPs with access to YouTube inventory could
build profiles of users based on their viewing history, which would be a data
protection risk.130
126Testimony of Brian O’Kelley before the US Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing on Under-
standing the Digital Advertising Ecosystem and the Impact of Data Privacy and Competition Policy,
pages 5–6<www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/O’Kelley%20Testimony.pdf>.
127CMA Final Report, paras 5.263–5.264.
128ibid, para 5.264.
129CMA, ‘Online Platforms and Digital Advertising’ Market Study Interim Report (18 December 2019)
para 5.210 <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5ed0f75bd3bf7f4602e98330/Interim_
report_---_web.pdf>.
130Google, ‘Online Platforms and Digital Advertising Comments on the Market Study Interim
Report’ para 37 <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5e8c8290d3bf7f1fb7b91c2c/
200212_Google_response_to_interim_report.pdf>. See also para 97: “The Interim Report suggests
that it may be appropriate to integrate new sources of demand with our YouTube inventory
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This was the first time Google publicly argued that its decision to pull
YouTube inventory from AdX was motivated by privacy and data protec-
tion considerations. When Neal Mohan, then VP, Display & Video
Advertising at Google, published a blog post in 2015 announcing the
YouTube policy change, terms such as “privacy” or “data protection”
were nowhere to be found.131 Instead, the decision to remove YouTube
inventory from AdX was said to help Google focus its development
efforts elsewhere:
To continue improving the YouTube advertising experience for as many of our
clients as possible, we’ll be focusing our future development efforts on the
formats and channels used by most of our partners. To enable that, as of the
end of the year, we’ll no longer support the small amount of YouTube
buying happening on the DoubleClick Ad Exchange.132
We are thus skeptical as to whether Google’s decision was indeed
motivated by privacy and data protection concerns. In any event, the con-
cerns put forward by Google were dismissed by the CMA, which noted
that “Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) have been proposed by
Google itself to allow targeted advertising without user profiling;
similar solutions could be adopted for YouTube as well”.133
B. Google’s decision to restrict portability of the DoubleClick ID
On 27 April 2018, on the eve of GDPR’s entry into force, Google
announced that marketers would no longer be allowed to export
certain data from its buy-side facing advertising products (DSP / ad
server for advertisers) in order to ensure compliance with the new data
protection rules.134 The restriction concerned the so-called DoubleClick
ID, a unique, cookie-based identifier assigned by Google to each user
(¶6.176). As noted above, restricting third-party access to YouTube inventory is the best way to keep
user data private and to reduce the likelihood of ‘bad’ ads appearing alongside content”.




133CMA Final Report, para 5.265.
134Alisson Weissbrot, ‘Google Sharply Limits DoubleClick ID Use, Citing GDPR’ (AdExchanger, 27 April
2018) <https://adexchanger.com/platforms/google-sharply-limits-doubleclick-id-use-citing-gdpr/>
stating that “[i]n its note to advertisers, Google has included that the DoubleClick ID, tied to sensitive
information like user search histories, could violate the strict data privacy requirements of GDPR”. Note
that this restriction was accompanied by additional policy changes relating to YouTube, which
however had been announced earlier. In January 2017 Google announced it would discontinue
support for third-party measurement pixels on YouTube. Then, on 6 April 2018 Google announced
it would no longer allow advertisers to use third-party ad servers to serve YouTube ads in the EU,
“as part of [its] GDPR compliance efforts”.
EUROPEAN COMPETITION JOURNAL 35
exposed to a campaign executed through its products. Before the 2018
policy change, marketers could access this DoubleClick ID through
Google’s Data Transfer file service, which provided granular information
for each campaign. Marketers would then export the DoubleClick ID to
perform – with the help of independent ad tech vendors or their in-house
tools – basic advertising functions such as cross-platform measurement
(i.e. measuring the performance of the Google campaign against other
platforms), frequency capping and multi-touch attribution.
After Google’s policy change, the only way for marketers to access
granular, event-level data is through Ads Data Hub, Google’s cloud-
based measurement and activation solution, originally developed for
YouTube but then extended to DoubleClick and Google Display
Network inventory.135 Ads Data Hub is part of the Google Cloud Plat-
form and has been touted as a solution providing access to event-level
campaign data “in a privacy-centric environment”. Within Ads Data
Hub marketers may upload their own first-party data and map it
against Google’s first-party data in order to analyse the performance of
their campaigns.136 Recently, it was reported that Google tests offering
marketers the ability to create audiences within Ads Data Hub, which
they may then target through Google’s buy-side software, DV360.137
But Ads Data Hub has an important limitation: marketers cannot
export anything other than aggregated insights, and they are strictly pro-
hibited from disaggregating Google’s reports or identifying end users.138
In other words, data goes in but does not leave the Ads Data Hub
environment.139
135Kelly Liyakasa, ‘Google Extends YouTube Measurement System To DoubleClick And GDN’ (AdExchan-
ger, 24 May 2017) <www.adexchanger.com/ad-exchange-news/google-extends-youtube-
measurement-system-doubleclick-gdn/>.
136Note that, perhaps in an attempt to sweeten the deal, Ads Data Hub grants marketers access to
greater volumes of user data – instead of accessing the “DoubleClick ID”, marketers may now
access the “User ID” which is tied to Google’s logged-in environment and thus combines information
about users collected across all Google properties and devices, including Android. See James Hercher,
‘Marketers Struggle To Relearn The Former DoubleClick ID’ (AdExchanger, 4 March 2020) <www.
adexchanger.com/online-advertising/marketers-struggle-to-relearn-the-former-doubleclick-id>.
137James Hercher, ‘Google Tests Audience Buying In ADH, A Big Step from Analytics to Activation’ (AdEx-
changer, 26 March 2020) <www.adexchanger.com/online-advertising/google-tests-audience-buying-
in-adh-a-big-step-from-analytics-to-activation/>.
138<https://developers.google.com/ads-data-hub/policies> accessed 27 March 2020.
139As noted by Anthony Iacovone, co-founder and CEO of Barometric,
[t]he largest issue with Ads Data Hub is that it is a complete black box […] It houses raw user
and impression-level data, yet will not allow marketers to view or export anything in a format
that will allow for granular optimizations per user. They [Google] are asking marketers to send
all their data up into Ads Data Hub, and get nothing but aggregate counts back. There is no
way for marketers to now verify or question the validity of any data that Google places within
Ads Data Hub.
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This policy change has been described by industry commentators as a
move that “killed” independent attribution,140 and as an example of
“leveraging privacy concerns as a pretext” to further raise the walls of
Google’s garden.141 A particular concern is that within Ads Data Hub
marketers have no way to verify the accuracy and impartiality of
Google’s measurement analysis. They simply have to trust that Google
will “grade its own homework” fairly and will not overstate the perform-
ance of campaigns run through its own products vis-à-vis other cam-
paigns.142 The fact that the same company is both a service provider
and an auditor seems strange at best, and creates serious conflicts of
interests at worst.
C. Chrome’s decision to phase out third-party cookies by January
2022
In January 2020, Google once more invoked privacy to justify perhaps its
most controversial decision affecting online advertising: Chrome is
expected to phase out support for third-party cookies within the next
two years, as part of Google’s efforts to “increase the privacy of web
browsing”.143
Chrome is not the first browser to go after third-party cookies. For
years Safari has blocked all third-party cookies by default, and since
2017 it also blocks alternative tracking methods as part of its Intelligent
Tracking Prevention (“ITP”) feature.144 In September 2019, Mozilla
joined the club with its own anti-tracking mechanism for Firefox,
called Enhanced Tracking Protection (“ETP”).145 While not negligible,
See George Slefo, ‘Google’s Removal of DoubleClick ID Presents Litany of Issues for Brands, Agencies’
(AdAge, 8 May 2018) <https://adage.com/article/digital/google-s-move-remove-doubleclick-id-
presents-issues/313415>.
140Martin Kihn, ‘Did Google Just Kill Independent Attribution?’ (AdExchanger, 7 May 2018) <https://
adexchanger.com/analytics/did-google-just-kill-independent-attribution/>.
141Robin Jurzer, ‘Google to Stop Media Buyers from Using DoubleClick IDs, Keeping Measurement & Attri-
bution within Its “Walled Garden”’ (MarTech Today, 11 May 2018) <https://martechtoday.com/google-
to-stop-media-buyers-from-using-doubleclick-ids-keeping-measurement-attribution-within-its-
walled-garden-215246>.
142George Slefo, ‘Google’s Removal of DoubleClick ID Presents Litany of Issues for Brands, Agencies’
(AdAge, 8 May 2018) <https://adage.com/article/digital/google-s-move-remove-doubleclick-id-
presents-issues/313415>.
143Justin Schuh, ‘Building a More Private Web: A Path Towards Making Third Party Cookies Obsolete’
<https://blog.chromium.org/2020/01/building-more-private-web-path-towards.html>.
144Maciej Zawadziński, ‘What Is Intelligent Tracking Prevention and How Does It Work? versions 1.0–2.3’
(The Clearcode Blog) <https://clearcode.cc/blog/intelligent-tracking-prevention/>.
145Marissa Wood, ‘Today’s Firefox Blocks Third-Party Tracking Cookies and Cryptomining by Default’ (The
Mozilla Blog, 3 September 2019) <https://blog.mozilla.org/blog/2019/09/03/todays-firefox-blocks-
third-party-tracking-cookies-and-cryptomining-by-default/>.
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the impact of ITP and ETP on the ad tech ecosystem has been rather
limited, considering the modest market share of Apple and Mozilla
when it comes to web browsing. Since Google, on the other hand,
boasts a worldwide market share in excess of 64%,146 it is fair to say
that Chrome’s policy change signals the demise of the third-party cookie.
To understand the profound consequences of Chrome’s announced
restriction, one should bear in mind that since its inception, online adver-
tising – at least in the open web, as opposed to the walled gardens of
Google or Facebook – has relied on third-party cookies for fundamental
functions, such as frequency capping (i.e. limiting the number of times an
ad is shown to the same person), targeting, conversion measurement and
attribution.147 For good or worse, no alternative to the third-party cookie
has so far gained widespread industry adoption. As a result, in the
absence of third-party cookies, online advertising in the open web risks
crumbling. According to Google’s own study, cookie-less impressions
result in approximately 52% less revenue for publishers.148 That seems
consistent with the finding that impressions on Safari and Firefox
(which already block third-party cookies) trade at a lower price, generat-
ing less revenue for publishers.149
As an alternative to third-party cookies, Google has proposed to
develop in collaboration with the wider online community (through
the World Wide Web or “W3C” consortium) a set of Application Pro-
gramming Interfaces (APIs) as part of the “Privacy Sandbox”. The
Privacy Sandbox is a Chromium initiative first announced in August
2019, whose mission is to enable online advertising while preserving
user privacy, or as the Chromium Project puts it, “[c]reate a thriving
web ecosystem that is respectful of users and private by default”.150
The basic concept behind the Privacy Sandbox is that all raw user data
should be stored and processed on the device itself (and more specifically
in the browser) and not made accessible to third parties. In order to
perform advertising functions (e.g. frequency capping), third parties
146See <https://gs.statcounter.com/browser-market-share> accessed 11 March 2020.
147For an overview of what web cookies are, how they function and how they are used in online adver-
tising, see Damien Geradin and Dimitrios Katsifis, ‘Taking a Dive Into Google’s Chrome Cookie Ban’ (19
February 2020) <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3541170>.
148Deepak Ravichandran and Nitish Korula, ‘Effect of Disabling Third-Party Cookies on Publisher Revenue’
(27 August 2019) <https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/disabling_third-party_cookies_
publisher_revenue.pdf>.
149Ari Paparo, ‘Google, You Finally Really Did It’ (AdExchanger, 14 January 2020) <www.adexchanger.
com/data-driven-thinking/google-you-finally-really-did-it/>; Mat Bennett, ‘Browser CPM Rates –
When It Comes to Ad Revenue, All Browsers Aren’t Equal’ (OKO Digital, 5 July 2019) <https://oko.
uk/blog/cpm-by-browser>.
150See <www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-privacy/privacy-sandbox>.
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(e.g. ad tech vendors, marketers etc.) will tap through the Privacy
Sandbox APIs and extract aggregated insights. In other words, data
collection will move to the browser itself, and advertising will move
away from individuals and towards cohorts (larger group of users
where individuals will not be identified).
As of the time of writing this paper, progress at the W3C on the
Privacy Sandbox has been limited,151 and concerns have been expressed
that it is a process dominated by Google.152 Considering Google’s history
of self-preferencing in the ad tech ecosystem,153 legitimate questions can
be raised as to whether the APIs will be implemented in a neutral manner
or whether the owner of the browser, namely Google, will keep an advan-
tage for itself. For instance, Google could grant its own buy-side solutions
(DV360, Google Ads) superior access to information (e.g. access to non-
aggregated data), and it is unclear whether third parties would be in a
position to detect that.154 In any event, given the central role of the
browser in the various Privacy Sandbox proposals, there is a risk, as
the CMA explained, that Chrome could become “the key bottleneck
for ad tech”. In this case, “[m]arket participants may be concerned
that, under these proposals, Chrome would have the ability to use its pos-
ition to favour Google’s own ad tech intermediation services and raise
barriers to entry”.155
Worse, if the APIs do not perform as well as third-party cookie-based
tracking mechanisms, ad spend on “walled gardens” such as Google or
Facebook will increase to the detriment of the open web and the ad
tech ecosystem that supports it.156 The reason is that walled gardens’
151Sarah Sluis, ‘W3C Ad Tech Members Panicked About Slow Progress for Third-Party Cookie Alternative’
(AdExchanger, 6 July 2020) <www.adexchanger.com/online-advertising/w3c-ad-tech-members-
panicked-about-slow-progress-for-third-party-cookie-alternative/>.
152See Allison Schiff, ‘House Antitrust Report Highlights Unequal Power Dynamics at the W3C’ (AdExchan-
ger, 12 October 2020) <www.adexchanger.com/online-advertising/house-antitrust-report-highlights-
unequal-power-dynamics-at-the-w3c/>.
153CMA Final Report, para 5.271 et seq.
154Mathew Broughton, ‘The Hijacking of Privacy for Monopolisation’ (Exchange Wire, 26 February 2020)
<www.exchangewire.com/blog/2020/02/26/the-hijacking-of-privacy-for-monopolisation/>, noting
that
[e]ven if Google releases the sandbox to everyone at once, as it should if user privacy is indeed
its top priority, it could in theory give itself a helping hand by retaining user-level granularity,
while offering others only aggregate data. One Privacy Sandbox API allows the allocation of a
“privacy budget” purportedly to mitigate fingerprinting. Who sets the budget for each site?
Who gathers and measures the data exposed to each site? Who enforces against violations
of the budget? And who sets exemptions for the budget?
155CMA Final Report, para 5.327.
156James Rosewell, ‘Google’s Privacy Sandbox is a Plan Worthy of a Bond Villain’ (28 February 2020)
<www.linkedin.com/pulse/googles-privacy-sandbox-plan-worthy-bond-villain-james-rosewell/>
(“[b]y only killing third-party cookies and attacking all technical alternatives under the guise of privacy,
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ability to identify users on their platform relies on user login and will thus
remain intact from any Chrome policy change. If online advertising in
the open web cannot deliver its promise of one-to-one marketing,
rational marketers would be expected to shift their budget towards the
“walled gardens”, which already capture the lion’s share of digital ad
spend.157 This was concern was raised by the CMA in its Final Report
on its market study on online platforms and digital advertising:
Therefore, to the extent that targeted advertising on open display inventory is
less feasible or effective without third-party cookies, advertisers may substitute
spending away from open display advertising and towards advertising on plat-
forms’ owned-and -operated inventory.158
After all, it should not be forgotten that at the same time Google com-
petes for ad revenue with its very customers, namely publishers using its
ad tech solutions. It thus appears questionable whether Google will have
the incentive to invest in workable APIs that could replace third-party
cookies in terms of effectiveness. If such APIs end up performing less
effectively, Google might argue that this is a necessary compromise
between enabling online advertising and maintaining higher privacy
standards. Yet one cannot help but observe that Google seems to lack
the same sensitivity towards privacy when it comes to online advertising
on its own properties, where the Chrome restrictions will have little
impact.
Finally, it is interesting to note that Google has alternative ways, not
relying on third-party cookies (and thus not affected by the upcoming
change), to track users across sites, such as Chrome itself: whenever a
user is signed into any Google service (e.g. Gmail), she is automatically
signed into Chrome.159 If the user enables sync with her Google
account and turns web and app activity on, then her browsing history
while leaving first party cookies untouched the value of the Walled Gardens’ inventory increases while
simultaneously nuking that of their smaller rivals”). See also Joshua Koran, ‘The Death of Third-Party
Cookies Disproportionately Hurts Small Publishers’ (AdExchanger, 25 March 2020) <www.
adexchanger.com/the-sell-sider/the-death-of-third-party-cookies-disproportionately-hurts-small-
publishers/>, (“[b]y eliminating third-party cookies, there is a high probability of effectively limiting
smaller publishers’ ability to compete online”.) See also ‘The Death of Cookies Will Create Data Mon-
opolies’ (Medium, 17 April 2020) <https://medium.com/@ipullrank/the-death-of-cookies-will-create-
data-monopolies-40b92b0e13ca>, (“[u]ltimately, moving in this direction is going to create ‘walled
gardens’ that put smaller ad networks at a disadvantage, further consolidating power in the hands
of the Googles, Facebooks, and Amazons of the world. While Google may insist that this move is motiv-
ated by its altruism and a deep concern for the privacy of users, it’s pretty clear to me that this is a
power move”).
157Perrin (n 6).
158CMA Final Report, para 5.325.
159<www.google.com/chrome/privacy/> accessed 5 April 2020. This feature received significant criti-
cism, in that the Chrome sync UI is a dark pattern. See Matthew Green, ‘Why I’m Leaving Chrome’
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is saved in her Google account on Google’s servers and may be used to
personalize experience on other Google products.160 This allows
Google to have an accurate view on the browsing history of users,
without any need to rely on third-party cookies.
D. Some thoughts on the “privacy defence”
If Google’s response to the CMA Interim Report is to offer a glimpse in
the future, we can expect the “privacy defence” to be raised more and
more often. Indeed, Google’s response is remarkable for using privacy
as a sort of all-purpose justification.161 “Privacy concerns” are put
forward to justify various controversial practices – from pulling
YouTube inventory from AdX to limiting the bidding data provided to
publishers and refusing to participate in header bidding162 – but also
to challenge remedies the CMA proposed in order to increase compe-
tition in search (such as sharing click and query data with rival search
engines),163 and to increase fee transparency in the ad tech ecosystem
(such as imposing transaction IDs).164 This privacy rhetoric raises
serious concerns.
In the first place, Google appears to suggest that merely invoking user
privacy or data protection suffices to automatically shake any antitrust
liability off its shoulders – or to put it differently, remove the “special
responsibility” of a dominant undertaking under Article 102 TFEU.165
(23 September 2018) <https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2018/09/23/why-im-leaving-
chrome/>.
160<www.google.com/chrome/privacy/> accessed 5 April 2020.
161Google, ‘Online Platforms and Digital Advertising Comments’ (n 130). The word “privacy” alone
appears a total of 42 times in the 25-page submission.
162ibid para 37 (regarding YouTube inventory), 43 and 48 (regarding the bidding data provided to pub-
lishers) and 39 (regarding header bidding). Header bidding is an auction type to which the ad tech
industry resorted in response to what it perceived as Google using its ad server to favour its own inter-
mediation activities.
163ibid para 76:
aside from the risk of a data breach, the very fact of us sharing query data with third-parties
could do irreparable harm to our reputation. Users trust us to treat their queries appropriately.
Handing over those queries to third-parties – especially if this is done for money – may cause
users to lose confidence in their ability to search privately with us.
Whether users indeed trust Google to make private searches, including sensitive searches (e.g. health-
related searches) is a different issue.
164ibid para 100:
[i]mposing consistent transaction IDs raises potential privacy concerns by allowing advertisers
to join Google’s secure bid data with other information in a way that would allow individual
users to be identified. It would also allow various market participants along the intermediation
chain to “pool” user data without user consent.
165Note that Google should be able to argue that it has no other choice but to engage in a certain prac-
tice in order to comply with mandatory EU data protection rules. However, the threshold to be met is
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Under this approach, anything can be permissible, insofar it may
somehow be grounded on (vaguely defined) “privacy concerns”. This is
obviously far from satisfactory and threatens the effet utile of competition
rules.
In the second place, the analysis in the preceding Sections shows how a
dominant undertaking such as Google has become the de facto regulator
of privacy – which has aspects of a public good166 – wielding powers that
match or even exceed those of any DPA. While post-GDPR DPAs may
impose significant fines, Google may simply change the rules of the
game depending on its own interpretation of “privacy” or “data protec-
tion”, leaving customers and rivals with no choice but to comply with
its privately set rules. And while in the case of DPAs the law provides
for due process and the ability to seek judicial review of their decisions,
in the case of a private regulator such as Google there is little affected
companies may do. At best, they are confined to participating in a con-
sultation process run by Google, as in the case of the Privacy Sandbox.
At worst, Google may abuse its regulatory function to favour its own
business and exclude rivals under the pretext of privacy.
There is thus a compelling case for regulators to intervene and address
Google’s de facto regulatory function. At the very least, regulators should
go beyond the surface and determine whether the privacy defense put
forward is genuine and not a smokescreen for anti-competitive
conduct. This leads us to make four suggestions, which could apply
more broadly, i.e. would not be necessarily limited to Google.
First, the digital platform invoking privacy should lay down in detail
its “privacy concerns”, so that regulators may determine whether such
concerns are substantiated. Simply referring to “privacy” or “data protec-
tion risks” should not be sufficient as an objective reason to justify other-
wise anticompetitive practices.
Second, regulators should treat privacy concerns with great caution
whenever these are raised selectively, e.g. only when it comes to rivals.
For instance, Google’s policy change in Chrome rejects the very
concept of one-to-one advertising on the open web as bad for user
privacy, even if the user has granted her consent in compliance with
the GDPR. On the other hand, Google does not seem to be concerned
about privacy when it comes to its owned and operated properties,
where one-to-one advertising will still be the norm. Google considers
high, as Google will have to show that it has no margin of discretion when implementing the rules and
there are no less restrictive alternatives to secure compliance with the law.
166Joshua AT Fairfield and Christoph Engel, ‘Privacy as a Public Good’ (2015) 65 Duke Law Journal 385.
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user consent sufficient for it to engage in extensive data processing activi-
ties, including combining data across its user-facing services under a
single privacy policy and associating data with real-world identities.
The fact that Google seeks to hold its rivals to a higher standard than
the one applied to itself raises suspicions as to whether its privacy con-
cerns are genuine.
Third, regulators should be aware that even if a certain product change
leads to increased privacy for users, that does not necessarily mean that it
should escape antitrust scrutiny. Instead, any positive effects for consu-
mers (e.g. in the form of increased privacy) should be balanced against
any negative effects on competition. The net effect may eventually be
negative for consumers. In the case of Chrome’s policy change, the incre-
mental benefit brought to consumers in the form of increased privacy
may be much smaller than expected, considering that it will do
nothing to increase privacy within the walled gardens of Google and
Facebook – which are the most popular websites on the web.167 After
all, it should not be forgotten that advertising in walled gardens may
be more privacy-intrusive than cookie-based advertising in the open
web, as it involves profiling and targeting users based on their real-
world identities (as opposed to random anonymous identifiers in the
case of cookie-based advertising in the open web). On the other hand,
the effects of Chrome’s policy change on competition seem significant.
If the open web is impoverished and data is centralized to a handful of
companies across the world, consumers could end up being worse off
on balance.168 As the CMA observed,
[m]easures which enhance an aspect of consumer privacy in the near term,
may have dynamic effects which risk a negative impact on consumer
welfare, for example a concentration of personal data amongst fewer providers,
so impacting consumer choices and control in the longer term.169
167‘The Top 500 Sites on the Web’ (Alexa) <www.alexa.com/topsites> accessed 30 April 2020; ‘Top Web-
sites Ranking’ (SimilarWeb) <www.similarweb.com/top-websites> accessed 30 April 2020.
168See also Koran (n 156), noting that
[w]hile these business interests are important, societal interests should take precedence. Cen-
tralizing more data in fewer companies is likely not the desired outcome for most privacy advo-
cates. The policies behind some regulations and browser changes ironically do just that.
Freedom of expression is fundamental to thriving democracies. How should we evaluate pol-
icies that limit the number of platforms that enable consumers to interact with each other?
How should we evaluate policies that limit the companies marketers and publishers can
work with? Hopefully, we continue to support policies that increase the number of voices,
rather than diminish them.
169CMA Final Report, para 5.328.
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Finally, on the enforcement side, it is crucial that different regulators
(e.g. national competition authorities (“NCAs”), DPAs) cooperate with
each other in order to avoid pursing an overly narrow approach. On
the positive side, it seems that regulators are gradually becoming aware
of this worrying trend of invoking privacy considerations to engage in
restrictive conduct. For instance, the CMA appears sensitive to the con-
cerns raised by the Privacy Sandbox. The CMA has also found that
“Google and Facebook have a clear incentive to apply a stricter interpret-
ation of the requirements of data protection regulation when it comes to
sharing data with third parties than for the use and sharing of data within
their own ecosystems”, and proposed to work closely with the ICO in
order to consider “the appropriate approach to such concerns in the
future”.170
VI. Looking forward
While the GDPR has played a major role in strengthening data protection
in the EU, it seems to have had unintended consequences, such as further
strengthening Google to the detriment of small and medium-size market
players in the ad tech ecosystem. As we have seen, that is the case for two
reasons. First, the GDPR has increased market concentration in ad tech
markets already dominated by Google. Second, Google has been increas-
ingly invoking the GDPR or broader privacy considerations to justify
conducts which are prima facie problematic under competition law. At
the same time, Google has bundled the privacy policies of its various pro-
ducts, allowing it to combine data it collects through its products for uses
within its various internal units. This “internal data free-for-all”, which is
of course advantageous to its ad tech activities, is questionable under the
GDPR’s purpose limitation principle.
It is thus imperative that the Commission, DPAs and NCAs identify
and remedy these shortcomings in the interpretation and enforcement
of the GDPR which affect competition in the market.
First, it is crucial that the Commission takes into account the imbal-
ance of power in terms of financial and human resources that exists
between large and small players. Considering the substantial implemen-
tation and compliance costs the GDPR entails, the Commission should
examine the differentiated effects of the GDPR to different-sized compa-
nies. While the GDPR already imposes additional obligations the riskier
170ibid para 5.330.
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the type of processing, the baseline obligations imposed still dispropor-
tionately affect medium and small size companies. A more differentiated
approach might therefore be needed to avoid unintended consequences
to the detriment of such companies.
Second, it is imperative that the GDPR be effectively and uniformly
enforced across the EU. As shown above, the one-stop-shop principle
allows large platforms to escape liability due to the reluctancy of
certain DPAs to undertake investigations and impose sanctions, but
also due to the practical limitations following from the lack of human
resources and technical expertise to deal with a vast amount of com-
plaints against such players. At the same time, smaller ad tech players
have been subject to rigorous scrutiny by certain DPAs. We recognize
the benefits of the one-stop-shop system, in that it allows companies to
only deal with one DPA and to avoid simultaneous investigations and
possibly contradicting decisions in the different EU Member States. We
therefore do not call for a repeal of this mechanism, as doing so would
complicate GDPR compliance and enforcement for numerous companies
engaged in cross-border processing.
We however consider it necessary that a more uniform enforcement of
the GDPR be actively encouraged by the Commission and the EDPB. The
EDPB should identify problematic areas where divergent interpretations
of the GDPR have been adopted or might be adopted by DPAs across the
EU and level the playing field by issuing more guidance on how to inter-
pret and enforce the GDPR in the ad tech ecosystem. Moreover, the
Commission should challenge Member States where DPAs are not effec-
tively enforcing the GDPR and could even consider opening infringe-
ment proceedings, including in cases where Member States fail to give
DPAs the human and financial resources necessary to perform their
tasks as required by Article 52(4) of the GDPR.
We also recommend the establishment of a specialized “tech” unit at
the EU level – possibly within the EDPB – which would be staffed with
technical experts. This unit would help DPAs with the technical
aspects of investigations involving large tech companies. It would thus
help alleviate the burden of DPAs overwhelmed with complex investi-
gations, and facilitate and accelerate their investigations. As a last
resort, and only if GDPR enforcement remains ineffective – or distorted
by the uneven enforcement of its provisions in the Member States – in the
future, the Commission should consider whether the decentralized enfor-
cement system is appropriate or whether it should be replaced by an EU
privacy regulator with full supervision and enforcement powers.
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Third, regulators should ensure that the GDPR cannot be used as a
pretext to restrict data sharing and distort competition to the benefit of
large players holding abundant first-party data. As explained above, the
“privacy defence” raises serious concerns and threatens the effet utile of
competition rules. It is important that competition authorities – be it
the Commission or NCAs – should closely examine any justification
based on data protection legislation, if need be in close cooperation
with DPAs.
Finally, regulators should keep a watchful eye on Google’s decision to
phase out third-party cookies on Chrome and the evolution of the
Privacy Sandbox, as it is bound to fundamentally alter the shape of
online advertising in the open web. Though formally an open source
project, we are skeptical as to which extent third parties will have any
meaningful say in the process, and past experience from the Android
Open Source Project shows how Google may end up running initiatives
which are nominally open source. There is a real risk that Chrome’s
policy change will further strengthen walled gardens to the detriment
of the open web (and the ad tech ecosystem). Indeed, the Privacy
Sandbox risks making the browser the “gatekeeper” of data, on which
third parties (be it publishers, advertisers or ad tech vendors) will be
dependent. As more ad spend is concentrated on the walled gardens,
the open web may become impoverished, with all the societal impli-
cations this entails. While regulators have a duty to ensure that user
tracking on the web takes place in full compliance with the GDPR,
they also have a duty to preserve competition in the open web, from
which consumers stand only to benefit.
Acknowledgements
The authors advise a variety of ad tech vendors and publishers, including on matters
adverse to Google. The views expressed in this paper are the authors’ only.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
ORCID
Damien Geradin http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5378-8354
46 D. GERADIN ET AL.
